On the Pakistani front, however, things seem to deteriorate.

American and Pakistani officials expressed optimism last week that an agreement on re-establishing supply routes was imminent. Negotiators were narrowing their differences after three weeks of intense deliberations, they said, and it was hoped that an invitation for Pakistan to attend the summit would engender the good will needed to close the gap between the two sides.

The invitation was accepted, and Mr. Zardari arrived in Chicago on Saturday. But a deal on the supply lines remained elusive, and Mr. Obama would not meet with Mr. Zardari without it, American officials said.

The supply lines, through which about 40 percent of NATO’s nonlethal supplies had passed, were closed in late November after 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed in American airstrikes along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The deaths capped a year of crises between the United States and Pakistan that put immense strain on the two countries’ already fragile relationship.

The failure to strike a deal on the supply routes ahead of the summit injects new tension into the relationship.

In Pakistan, Dawn was optimistic, or at least its chosen headline betrayed optimism: “Pakistan, US signal optimism on supply routes deal”.

My own view is that a deal will be struck. Pakistan wants a deal, the U.S. wants a deal, and the only thing that separates them right now is the price of the deal. Of course, that’s usually a big impediment, but it’s a much smaller impediment that we had until about a week ago: the unwillingness of Pakistan to open up the routes. Anyway, here are some thoughts on this whole thing:

1. How big is the gap between the two countries’ prices?

The News reported (that the Christian Science Monitor reported) that a deal was about to be struck for a per-truck fee of between $1500 and $1800. The NYT reported today that the price demanded has gone up to $5000 (based on anonymous U.S. sources). So there’s three possibilities. One, the CSM/News had a bad source. Two, the NYT had a bad source. Three, a deal was struck, and Pakistan backtracked, and increased the price in the last three days.

2. Pakistan is entitled to ask for a higher price for trucks than it did previously

This is a bit of an obvious point, but you wouldn’t know it from reading angst-ridden and frustration-laden accounts in the western press about Pakistan’s actions here.

Look, there’s nothing wrong, per se, with using your leverage in order to obtain higher benefits (or lower costs) in one’s interaction with other actors. That’s IR 101. Pakistan has interests (however defined) and is allowed to pursue them. The U.S. and NATO do not have a right to transport war materials through Pakistan. It is a privilege to be granted. Right now, we are in the midst of a negotiation on what the price of that privilege is. If our position was really that egregious or ridiculous, the U.S. would’ve walked away, similar to how it treated our demands/requests that we be given a civilian nuclear deal similar to India’s. But the U.S., unlike the civilian nuclear deal case, is talking, because it has its own interests at stake, as this map from the Washington Post attests:

Map credit: Washington Post

I am interested, however, in the logic behind the increased price. Are we demanding a higher price simply because we like the idea of having more money? Is it because the U.S. refuses to apologize over Salala and we’re trying to make life difficult for them? Is it because a higher price would result in a bump in popularity for the PPP government back home, due to taking a “tougher line” with the U.S? I’ve heard some combination of these and other logics. The third one makes no sense whatsoever. It’s probably a bit of the first and a bit of the second.

(Update: Journalist Huma Imtiaz tweeted in response to this issue that “the 5k figure (if true) has a lot to do with how much the US pays for the NDN” (the Northern Distribution Network) and that we should “add in that the cost of repair for Pak highways that have been degraded in past 10 years due to the truck movements.”)

3. Leaders are meant to be ribbon-cutters

You know all those ceremonies where someone big and important cuts a red ribbon to inaugurate/celebrate something?

Think you could've used smaller scissors, gents.

Well, the obvious point to note is that the building/plaza/hotel/fancy-whatever is built before the big and important person gets there. They’re not laying brick while he’s mulling around with a giant pair of scissors.

Unfortunately, someone in our government seems to be unaware of this basic premise. Sending Zardari to Chicago without a deal being made was absolutely asinine. He should’ve gone there just to cut the ribbon. NOT to hope and pray for a deal. If there was no deal, he shouldn’t have gone. You know why? Because he, and by extension the government and state, ended up looking like idiots.

Predictably, this has led far right politicians like Imran Khan to pronounce that the Zardari trip was an utter disaster. Well, you can’t really argue against that. (Though it should be noted that Imran Khan would’ve said the exact same thing regardless of what actually happened in Chicago).

This was a mistake by whoever handles Zardari and his foreign policy treks. No doubt about it.

There is, however, another case ongoing as we speak, and it’s all quite hilarious. You will recall, of course, the bombshell news in early March, when a frail, wheelchair-bound former banker named Younis Habib described in intimate detail for the Supreme Court exactly how the ISI funneled money to anti-PPP politicians in the 1990 elections.

ISLAMABAD: A frail-looking Younus Habib, who headed the now defunct Mehran Bank, spilled the beans in the Mehrangate-IJI case on Thursday when he revealed in his first-ever statement before the Supreme Court that he had been forced by former president late Ghulam Ishaq Khan and former army chief Aslam Beg to arrange Rs340 million in the “supreme national interest”.

[...]

Younus Habib said Gen Aslam Beg and ISI’s Brigadier Hamid Saeed had provided number of certain accounts in UBL, ABL and MCB for depositing the amount while the counterfoil of the deposit slip had been handed over to one Colonel Akbar.

Both Gen Aslam Beg and Asad Durrani were in the court, quietly listening to Mr Habib’s affidavit.

“In all I was asked to arrange Rs350 million by the former president and the army chief before the 1990 general elections,” said Mr Habib while reading out the affidavit.

Enter stage left Mirza Aslam Beg, who you may remember from his famous “We can make a first strike, and a second strike, or even a third. You can die crossing the street or you could die in a nuclear war. You’ve got to die some day anyway” line on the possibility of nuclear weapons in the 2002 crisis with India. Mr. Beg, honorable man that he is, completely denied his role in the Mehrangate scandal.

In the statement submitted Wednesday, Baig has maintained the stance that the alleged funds were transferred into the ISI’s accounts, and not the Army’s accounts. Baig has claimed that he neither had any knowledge of orders to distribute the funds by then president of Pakistan Ghulam Ishaq, nor was he aware of any illicit activity concerning the funds.

The former military chief has further claimed that the ISI at the time was not operating under the command of the Army chief.

I don’t know what’s more fanciful: the idea that Beg was an innocent, know-nothing bystander in all of this, or the idea that the ISI’s workings and dealings fell outside the purview of the Army high command. Either way, step forward Mr. Asad Durrani, then ISI chief:

Durrani on Wednesday submitted a counter affidavit in response to former army chief Gen (retd) Mirza Aslam Beg’s statement in which he blamed the ISI for ‘corrupt practices’.

Durrani, defending his position, insisted that the role of ISI and MI to distribute funds among various politicians and political parties was lawful, and he added that Beg was also informed about the plan. “The ISI did have the mandate to carry out this task, which has often been reiterated during the proceedings of this case,” the former spymaster maintained.

“The decision to disburse election donations through the ISI may well have been taken by then president Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who, having handpicked the caretaker government including its Prime Minister Mustafa Jatoi, was de-facto the chief executive. The operation was therefore lawful and it followed an established chain of command,” Durrani said.

[...]

“Be as it may, ISI as an organisation responds to multiple centres of power: the president, in his capacity as the supreme commander of the Armed Forces; the three service chiefs and the chairman JSHQ; and indeed the prime minister. In practice, however, the army chief wields more power over the ISI than any of its other ‘bosses’; not only because of his extraordinary status in the national polity, but also because most of the ISI’s senior appointments including its director general are serving soldiers,” Durrani explained.

Now, let me make a few points about all of this.

One, judge me all you want, but I find this whole “jackals turning on each other” thing highly entertaining and fun. Sue me.

Durrani and Beg, seen here in their natural habitat

Two, I love — just love — the fact that Pakistani taxpayer money transferred to the bank accounts of certain politicians through the ISI is called “election donations”. Election donations! He makes it sound like sadka. Which, I suppose, it was in a way.

Three, I love the defense that just because the operation involved the President and “followed a chain of command” that it was legal. Listen, buddy. The holocaust followed a chain of command too. Doesn’t make it legal.

Four, I greatly appreciate Durrani’s candor here. It’s nice for a khaki to just come out and say “the army chief wields more power over the ISI than any of its other ‘bosses’; not only because of his extraordinary status in the national polity, but also because most of the ISI’s senior appointments including its director general are serving soldiers”. I respect that. Kudos Durrani sahib, kudos.

Five, this episode is instructive for those people who claim corruption is the biggest evil plaguing Pakistan. First of all, stealing elections is MUCH worse than stealing money. Secondly, even if you think stealing money is worse, these buggers took almost half a billion rupees. That’s 1990 rupees, not 2012 rupees. That’s a lot of money. Third, Beg siphoned off a lot of this cash (more than Rs.150 million) for himself, his family, his friends, and his “NGO” (link via @shahidsaeed). If you can read the last link and still think the Nawaz/Zardari level corruption is what ails this country, then I can’t help you.

Six, there’s a popular line of thought amongst certain sections of liberal/PPP-supporting circles that this judiciary has it all out for them and is in fact an extension of the establishment. While I have no love lost for Holy Man Chaudhry, the idea that a court investigating the 1990 elections and the missing-persons issue is somehow an extension of the very people who carried (and carry) out those crimes is quite stupid. I’ll grant that both the robes and the khakis hate the PPP, but both the Republicans and al-Qaeda hate Barack Obama; that doesn’t make them friends.

Look, I have no strong opinion either way on opening or delaying the NATO supply routes. My only point is if you make the opening of these routes conditional on X, and X doesn’t happen, and you open them anyway, well, you look like an idiot.

Anyway, as a proud resident of Chicago for five years, here are my recommendations for the hangers-on/bureaucrats/aides/random journos that make their way to this beautiful city.

Things to do

1. Chicago has awesome museums. Make sure to go to the Museum of Science and Industry (especially if you’re with kids), the Shedd Aquarium, the Art Institute, and my personal favorite, the Chicago History Museum (which is not a “history” museum but a “Chicago history” museum). If you plan on going to three or four of these main attractions, you should get a Chicago CityPASS, which will save you money.

2. Make sure to catch a show at Second City comedy club, a great place for sketch and improv comedy. Almost anyone you’ve heard of on Saturday Night Live or the Daily Show graduated from Second City (including Tina Fey, Amy Poehler, Steve Carrell, Stephen Colbert etc etc). You’ll have a good time, as long as you don’t sit in the front row.

3. If you’re not afraid of heights, go to the Skydeck at Sears Tower. They have these boxes that jut out of the building on the top floor that you can stand in, and basically look down through a glass floor all the way to the ground. The NYT had a nice article on these glass boxes last year. Here’s a picture of me 103 floors up off the floor:

4. If it’s a clear day, walk along the lakefront. Just trust me on this. The water is Caribbean blue on those days, and if you turn your head, you see one of the greatest downtown districts in America.

5. Don’t waste too much time in the downtown shopping area; there’s nothing distinctive about it from any other major city you’ve been to. What is distinctive about Chicago is the extent to which it is a city of neighborhoods, especially compared to other major American cities. Walk around different neighborhoods and you’ll see the difference for yourself. Walk around in Wicker Park, the Gold Coast, Rogers Park, Lakeview, UIC/Little Italy, and Hyde Park, and you’ll get a nice varied sense of the city. Ask locals how to get to each of these, public transport should work for you almost all the time.

Places to eat

Relatively fancy: Salpicon (Mexican), Bistrot Zinc (French), Boka (great place for a date).

More chilled out: Cafe Ba Ba Reeba (Tapas), The Bristol, Mista (great thin crust pizza).

Down and dirty: Usmania (desi food, more hijabis here than Karachi), Crisp (Korean fried chicken, best you’ll ever have).

Other stuff

1. I’m biased here, but take a walk around the University of Chicago campus. Make sure to visit Powell’s bookstore, if you do go. If you have access to a car or don’t mind cabbing it, try to go to the Northwestern campus too, it’s really gorgeous.

2. Lots of people enjoy the boat architecture tour. If you’re into boats or architecture, you could try it out.

3. If you’re foreign, do not under any circumstances get sucked into watching a baseball game. Americans will try to con you with phrases like “Wrigley Field is really quaint” and “you haven’t been to America until you watch a baseball game”. Ignore these people.

The basic logic of the globalization-leads-to-dampened-nationalism is the following: as people come into contact with each other, and as increasing trade/technology/movement/migration render borders less relevant, people will realize that many of the things they thought about other people were false, and abandon those ancient hatreds. So, for instance, many people who support the Indo-Pak peace process argue for increased “people to people” contacts, in the hope that this will lead to a breaking down of stereotypes and lead to more lovey-dovey feelings.

The reason I disagree with this logic is that increased connectedness is often associated with more stereotyping and hatred of others, rather than less. It’s telling that the literature on nationalism and national identity is quite clear that more communication and interaction tends to increase conflict among peoples. The basic idea is that with increased communication and interaction, you get a better sense of how other people are different from you, leading to more cultural awareness of your identity, leading to an increased salience of ethnic/cultural/linguistic/national differences, leading to more conflict.

There’s plenty of illustrations of this, but I’ll give two here. First, consider that the first traces of a truly national identity in Europe in the pre-modern age were found in university towns, where students from different territories (we can hardly call them countries or nations at that point) formed “national” gangs and groups. This is instructive because university towns were one of the few places that people from different regions actually came into contact with one another in that age. (See Bloom 1993 for more on this).

Second, consider the massive effects the printing press and the spread of vernaculars had on nationalism in early modern Europe. Print capitalism allowed people to tap into, and share, written histories and literatures on a much wider scale than previously possible. In turn, this allowed people to see far beyond their parochial communities in search of people like them and, as importantly, in search of people unlike them. Your sense of belonging to a community will only be reinforced once you realize that there are others out there who are saying the same things as you, and still others out there who are not. (See the grand-daddy of nationalism studies, Anderson 1983 for more on this).

In many ways, the internet and globalization is the Printing Press 2.0. This is why I strongly believe that globalization has and will continue to lead to greater self-awareness of identity rather than less. Think about how internet message boards or comments sections of blogs work: when you see the opinions expressed by the Other, whoever it may be, are you persuaded, or is it just more evidence in your favor for how stupid/primitive/backward/biased/racist/haughty the Other generally is?

Credit: XKCD

Think about how increased migration of brown people in Europe has led to a rise in right-wing parties enjoying favor. Think about how large, metropolitan cities such as London or New York see people retreat into predictable geographical distributions, with Xs living in X neighborhood and the ABCs living in the ABC neighborhood (sitting on a subway for its entire route is very instructive in such cities; if you want to see the color of a train change, get on the red line in Chicago at one end and wait until you get to the other).

This is not to suggest that particular cultural/ethnic/national identities cannot die away or their salience can’t decrease; only that increased social communication and interaction per se is not the road one takes to get there.

Quite new, or old but dramatically transformed, social groups, environments and social contexts called for new devices to ensure or express social cohesion and identity to structure social relations. At the same time a changing society made the traditional forms of ruling by states and social or political hierarchies more difficult or even impracticable. This required new methods of ruling of establishing bonds of loyalty. In the nature of things, the consequent invention of ‘political’ traditions was more conscious and deliberate, since it was largely undertaken by institutions with political purposes in mind. Yet we may as well note immediately that conscious invention succeeded mainly in proportion to its success in broadcasting on a wavelength to which the public was ready to tune in. Official new public holidays, ceremonies, heroes or symbols, which commanded the growing armies of the state’s employees and the growing captive public of schoolchildren, might still fail to mobilize the citizen volunteers if they lacked genuine popular resonance.

I think this is broadly accurate, though I’m pretty sure the public would have “tuned in” to any broadcast which cast some people as Others and some not. Human beings are a tribal species. We like being in groups, and we like delineating who belongs in those groups and who doesn’t. That these boundaries were constructed on a national basis rather than something else is an interesting, contingent development, but by no means was it inevitable. In a sense, Hobsbawm isn’t giving states enough credit here.

But this essay is great precisely because it traces the evolution of things like anthems and flags which we assume have been around forever but in fact are very recent additions to our social and political landscape. The “invention of tradition” is exactly the reason I can’t take it seriously. As Jan Pettman notes, “one of the paradoxes of nationalism is that an identity frequently celebrated and authenticated through reference to the past is judged in scholarship to be modern.” The state and its agents tell me to sing the national anthem with pride, to look up at the flag, to believe in the joy of August 14 or September 6 or March 23, to be moved by statues and memorials and mausoleums…but I can’t. It’s all patently fake to me. All of it: stamps, flags, uniforms, fighter-jets-as-roundabouts, carefully crafted histories, myths of suffering, parables — all of it. They’re not going to massage and coerce me into being patriotic, though I commend their efforts.

There is one exception to this rule, however. I took a trip to the Gilgit-Baltistan area a few years ago with a friend and his dad; we went to Chitral and Gilgit and Hunza, all the way up to the border with China, at Khunjrab pass. I saw a lot of military graves in that area, which makes sense, since it was seven years after Kargil and the Northern Light Infantry was drawn from the area. I must confess that seeing those graves and those headstones — with dates indicating that many of these soldiers were younger than I was at the time (23) — was one of the few times I felt powerful pangs of patriotism. I am sure there is a good psychological or anthropological reason for this exception, but I don’t know what it is.

The bottom line, for me anyway, is that the rise of nationalism in the modern world is no accident. States have learned that few things are more useful than a sense of nationhood when attempting to inculcate loyalty and obedience amongst its citizens. And I don’t know about you, but I hate being treated like a puppet.

Facebook profile pic! Photo: Reuters

Via Yahoo sports.

A few hours into the journey, as the Shalimar Express entered Punjab, two soldiers entered our compartment. Like me, the soldiers have made a twelve-hour journey through the high mountains to the railway station in Jammu. Ahead of us was a fourteen-hour train ride to Delhi. The solders smiled and dropped their bags in the aisle. “Will you please make room for us?” one of them asked a middle-aged man reading a newsmagazine. “We are going home after a year in Kashmir and don’t have any reservations.” The man was unmoved. The soldier repeated his request, and as I squirmed in my seat, another passenger pointed at the dirty floor and said, “You may sit there.” I was stunned. Grandfather and I looked at each other. Unlike people in Kashmir, our north Indian fellow passengers had no reason to be scared of the soldiers: They ordered them around, and the soldiers obeyed.

Couple of points. First, it’s interesting that Peer frames the choice of letting the soldiers sit in the train this way. He makes it about fear: if you’re from Kashmir, you’re afraid of them, and you would let them sit. If you’re not, you won’t be, and you won’t. But there’s alternate frames one could employ for this scene: respect, or lack thereof, or empathy, or lack thereof.

Second, the plural of anecdote is not data, so I really don’t know how widespread or “real” this view of Indian soldiers is, but it is interesting to think about why certain societies revere their soldiers more than others. In the U.S. for instance, people in uniform are treated with a great deal of reverence and respect — the “Support the Troops” bumper stickers, the endless tributes to their sacrifices in public speeches by elected and unelected officials, the absolute reluctance to call their war crimes “war crimes”. As an outsider, I consider it fairly over the top. It’s easy to imagine other societies tipping toward the other extreme.

I have had almost no interaction with soldiers in my life, but I have been around and come across police quite a bit, and can safely say that cops in Pakistan are treated with only slightly more respect than poorly paid maids and servants. If that. Again, it’s an interesting question as to why respect for certain institutions exists in some places but not others. I can think of many reasons cops are disrespected in Pakistan, and truth be told, a lot of those reasons are unfair to them.

From a piece on April 6th, on the parliamentary review of relations with the U.S.:

The question is: do we want such sovereignty, national honour and integrity as we have been practising to define our march forward in a world that is increasingly interdependent? It is in the pursuance of such isolationist internal and external policies that we have wreaked havoc at home and lost many friends, including China, of late. Depending heavily on the US and its regional allies economically, especially the Gulf Sheikhs and international market mechanisms, can Pakistan base its foreign policy on the mere wishes of its politicians to score brownie points with the generals and the electorate in an election year?

We will be deceiving ourselves by focusing on the half truth that the US needs Pakistan; we also need the US and its allies for our own sanity and a chance at survival. The lunatic fringe sympathetic to the Taliban and the like is only a fringe. The politicians and the generals are doing Pakistanis a disservice by mainstreaming their ruinous agenda in foreign policy considerations. Let the think tanks, foreign policy academics and economic managers guide the PCNS in its deliberations.

From a piece on March 9th, on the increasing attention to Balochistan given in the electronic media:

The state really has little defence in the face of such critical contradictions, which reveal total apathy to the condition of the people of Balochistan. Add to this the disappearances of Baloch youth, leaders and their mutilated bodies, and you have what you have: a rebellion against injustice with a popular appeal.

These well-founded grievances need to be heard by the Pakistani public, and the media is doing well to mainstream the dissident Baloch leaders albeit a bit late in the day.

Unfortunately, the precarious situation on ground does not permit TV crews to be there and bring documentary coverage of the actual situation and happenings. And ensconced in their ruling privileges, those in the Balochistan government remain equally apathetic to the woes of those who elect them.

From a piece on February 24th, on the failure of Islam to hold Pakistan together:

Islam as a state ideology has failed to unite Pakistanis as a nation, because religion has not done so since the abolition of the classical Muslim Caliphate, which clearly had run its course centuries ago; or else Muslims from Morocco and Bosnia to Brunei and Indonesia would form a single nation state today. Turks and Arabs would not have fought amongst themselves wars of conquest, and of deceit, respectively, the latter in cohorts with Britain and France in the 20-century; last but not least, there is not even a concept of a single Arab Muslim nation, let alone one great Nation of Islam.

This is because people will be people, and no two communities’ much loved and practised Islamic ideals really match for them to embrace an umbrella divine law under which everyone can live happily ever after. It hasn’t happened and it won’t happen for a long time. Why? Because all so-called ‘divine law’ is based on the interpretation of the divine sources by fallible, albeit great men of learning, who too could not but disagree with one another in their own historical times and spaces.

I always looked forward to reading Razvi; he was clear, forceful, and intelligent. He argued from a socio-political persuasion that is fast becoming extinct in Pakistan. He will be missed.

Interestingly, after Salman Taseer’s assassination, Razvi penned an article that concluded thusly:

Back to Mr Taseer’s assassination, it was rather uncanny to overhear a conversation that I did between two security guards outside the building they were deputed to guard, within minutes of the news of Mr Taseer’s death breaking. One guard congratulated the other on the assassination while the other responded by saying that the killer was indeed a very courageous man, God be praised.

This is not the country that makes one feel very safe.

Indeed. My thoughts and condolences to his family and friends.

Update: The articles I linked to were the ones that appeared in Dawn. In fact, the last piece Razvi wrote actually appeared in the Indian Express, where he opined on the Indo-Pak peace process (via @cyalm).

Earlier, Singh’s offer to transmit up to 5,000 MW power to the energy-starved west Punjab in particular was a gesture that was widely welcomed in Pakistan. The national grid’s shortfall, which covers Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, Sindh and Punjab, is touching the precise 5,000 MW figure. Pakistan has accepted the offer with much gratitude. Such confidence-building measures, whose fruits the public will reap directly, will help the democratic government at the Centre and particularly in Punjab, from where the army draws much of its muscle power, pull the rug from under the feet of anti-India extremists. Rogue elements in the army, too, who may have sympathy for the likes of Hafiz Saeed, will be forced to look the other way because the army as an institution never acts against public sentiment in Pakistan.

The strengthening of India-Pakistan relations, despite many unresolved issues between them, can work wonders for redefining Pakistan’s national security prerogatives over the medium to long term. If progress continues to be made in bilateral relations, the ruling Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) can rightly claim credit for it in what is now virtually an election year in Pakistan.

You’re going to destroy us. Honestly, I just want a bit of respectability to the scoreline. A Milan as opposed to a Leverkusen. We got no chance.

Incidentally, the subject line of said email was “Mercy”.

Of course, I tossed in the obligatory accusation of reverse jinxing, a time-honored tradition in email circles amongst sports fans. Zeyd swore that’s not what he was doing, but then again, that’s what a reverse jinxer would say.

The fact remains, though, that most people don’t really give Chelsea a chance. A tongue-in-cheek piece in the Guardian listed five reasons Chelsea might go through; the fifth of these called upon “getting lucky” and “start praying”, which as one commenter noted, is a bit revealing in and of itself. In a more serious piece, Gary Neville (who knew this guy would be such a good analyst post-retirement?) says that “even at their best, they won’t be good enough to beat Barcelona without unforeseen help” and that “I don’t want to appear overly pessimistic about Chelsea’s chances” before laying out exactly why he’s overly pessimistic about Chelsea’s chances.

I have to say, I find this all a bit nuts. I think Chelsea have a decent shot. Not a great shot, mind you, but a shot nonetheless. Here’s what I would do if I were Chelsea:

1. Start Didier Drogba in both games, and play him the full 90 minutes both times

Big, physical forwards tend to give Barcelona trouble. Fernando Llorente had some success against Barça earlier this season, as did I Am Zlatan. Teams that can withstand Barça’s first wave of pressure after losing the ball, and bypass the midfield by hoofing it up to a hold-the-ball-up-with-his-back-to-goal type of center forward can have success. Drogba fits both of these skill-sets. Moreover, he is excellent in the air and very physical in the box, which will make him (and Chelsea) dangerous at set pieces. In all likelihood, Gerard Pique will be given the assignment of marking Drogba, and while his form has improved of late, he has had an up-and-down season and is prone to the odd mistake. He can be gotten at.

2. Defend deep and narrow

Since the departure of Villas-Boas, Chelsea have returned to the Mourinho/Hiddink style of defending deep rather than pressing high. Given the relatively old and creaky legs in defence and in the center of the park, this is a good move, more suited to the actual personnel Chelsea have.

If Chelsea sit back, it will obviously become much harder for Barça to play in balls behind them. Moreover, two narrow banks of four are likely to give Barça trouble, since it will funnel attacks out to the wings and invite crosses, which is not really Barça’s game. Alexis Sanchez has excellent technique and power with his headers, but he’s still a relative midget. None of Barça’s main goalscorers are real threats in the air. Chelsea would do well to concede possession and ask Barça to cross it in all night. “Be my guest” should be their motto.

Of course, this presumes an ability to stay tight, disciplined, and not go chasing after the ball — which may or may not be applicable to players such as Cahill. But it does represent Chelsea’s best shot. There is one exception to this deep and narrow point, however…

3. Press Barça like crazy in the first 10 minutes

In recent big games, Barça have shown a tendency to make mistakes if they are pressed and harried early in the game. Against Milan in the first leg, Busquets misplaced a simple pass while Milan were pressing, and it opened up a ridiculously easy chance for Robinho to score (he missed). In the Liga Clasico in December, Benzema scored within the first twenty seconds as a result of a misplaced Valdes pass, again owing to high pressure. Madrid scored first in the first leg of the Copa Clasico too. Against United in last season’s Champions League final, it took Barça a while to get their rhythm going, and Hernandez had a half chance early on. There are myriad other examples of this.

The basic point is that because Barça insist on playing it out of the back, and because it takes a couple of touches and passes before all the players’ engines are warmed up, Barça are vulnerable to high pressure early on around their penalty box. It represents Chelsea’s best chance to score and grab a hold of the game (or tie).

4. Channel their anger

I’m not going to get into the relative merits and demerits of the refereeing in the 2009 tie; it’s not worth it. But it’s very clear that Chelsea remember that day with a great deal of anger. Dani Alves’ trolling probably did not help in this regard. This anger, properly channeled, can help Chelsea. When they have tired legs, when they’ve been chasing the ball for 85 minutes and no longer have the energy to make tackles or runs, when they go a goal or two down and have to summon mental strength — the anger can help. But they mustn’t allow it to overwhelm them. They have to control their emotions, their emotions can’t control them.

Heh.

5. Hope Mata has a blinder

It is understood that when the Spanish national team gets together, the rest of the team can’t really stay with the Barça players once they get the rondos going. There are two exceptions to this. One is David Silva. And the other is Juan Mata. This is another way of saying that Mata has the touch, technique, and skill to take on Barça at their own game. He’s had good games against Barça in the past. He won’t be overawed by the occasion or the opposition.He is the key player for Chelsea in this tie.

6. Pray

Barcelona are a better team than Chelsea. They have better forwards and midfielders than Chelsea. I’d rather have Puyol over Terry in the “inspirational center back captain who yells a lot at other players” role. Pep is a more innovative and flexible coach than Di Matteo. Over 180 minutes, the cream usually rises.

This is another way of saying the wholly unoriginal idea that Barcelona are favorites. They should go through. But they may not. One crazy shot from distance, a deflected free kick, an injury to a key player (Xavi is carrying a niggle, and you can bet that Madrid will spend all of Saturday happily kicking and stomping on anything that moves), a timely away goal — crazy stuff can happen. I genuinely believe that Chelsea can beat Barcelona. Unlike the other semifinal, where Madrid are absolutely, certifiably, categorically guaranteed to go through, the result in this semi is very much open.

President Asif Ali Zardari administered the oaths as five new federal ministers and six ministers of state were inducted into the Federal Cabinet.

Qamar Zama Karia, Raja Pervez Ashraf, Nazar Mohammad Gondal, Farooq Saeed Khan and Farzana Raja were appointed as federal ministers, while Tariq Anees, Raheela Baloch, Abbas Afridi, Moazzam Jatoi, Samsam Bukhari, Tasneem Qureshi were appointed ministers of state.

The new appointments brings the number of federal minister to 35, while the number of ministers of state is now 18.

This all got me curious, so I went over to the official website of the Government of Pakistan. I learned the following things that I did not know before:

1. We have a Ministry of Defence AND a  Ministry of Defence Production. These should be one government department.

2. We have a Ministry of Commerce, a Ministry of Industries, a Ministry of Textile Industries, a Ministry of Economic Affairs and Statistics, a Ministry of Privatization, a Ministry of Production, AND a Ministry of Professional and Technical Training (?). These should all be one government department.

3. We have a Ministry of Inter-Provincial Coordination, a Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit Baltistan, AND a Ministry of States and Frontier Regions. These should all be one government department.

4. We have a Ministry of Information Technology AND a Ministry of Science and Technology. These should be one government department.

This is what “political patronage” looks like. Literally make up a bunch of random jobs and give them to people who have either helped you in the past or who you would like to help you in the future (or both). My favorite out of all these is a “Ministry of National Harmony”. National harmony! As the kids say these days, LOLZZZ. How apposite is it that when you click on the website for this Ministry, you get this:

If you say so, buddy.

It’s amazing to me that amongst all these ministries, we do not have a Ministry for Minority Affairs. After Shahbaz Bhatti’s assassination, the government abolished the ministry through the 19th amendment. With Shias coming out on to the street to protest the wave of killings against them recently and demanding redressive action, this would be one ministry whose (re)introduction people would actually be behind. I wonder if the Zardari-Gilani tag team has considered this at all.

Update/correction: It turns out that they have indeed considered it; in fact, the Ministry of National Harmony is actually a reconstituted version of the Ministry of Minority Affairs. Thanks to @subh_e_azadi for the tip.

The one point I would make on trade is that trade in and of itself is not likely to reduce conflict between India and Pakistan. The evidence on how trade affects conflict is mixed at best (though leans slightly in the expected direction of more trade = less conflict). However, one thing worth noting is that Pakistan, according to reports, plans on importing energy and fuel products from India. If that happens, well, I wouldn’t go so far as to call it a game-changer, but it would be a massive shift. The basic point would be that a more stable energy supply would (a) do wonders for the everyday life of the average Pakistani, and (b) make a massive difference to the industrialist class in Pakistan.

Now, point (b) matters because of two reasons. One, the industrialist class is important, and while not always getting their way on domestic policy, at least have a voice that is heard. Two, the industrialist class has a lot of cross-connections to the retired-khaki class (and if you don’t believe me, go to Karsaz or Defence Golf Club some time and see for yourself). The point would be that if you can make the case that warmer relations with India benefits that particular class, then you can drive a wedge within some of the anti-peace-movement sections of the public.

Stuff like this won’t happen overnight (or maybe at all), but I think it’s important to lay out the possibility at least.

2. Whether the policy pays long-term dividends or not, you’ve got to tip your hat to the PPP government and its foreign policy crew. Other than relations with Russia (which we actually have now), this has been their best achievement in foreign affairs to date. Think about the confines within which they have to work: they don’t actually have control over “high politics” issues such as Kashmir or Hafiz Saeed, so they can’t promise anything to the Indians there. And they can’t concede too much, lest the khakis and the Difa-e-Pakistan Council types get their knickers in a twist. They’re locked in a 3-player game (India, our civvies, our khakis) where they are, by far, the weakest player, have the least freedom of movement, and the most to lose. And yet, slowly but surely, they’ve worked their way to something approaching a set of modest achievements.

You had me at hello. Photo: AP

It bears noting that none of the other major parties has given the PPP the slightest problem when it comes to rapprochement with India. Nawaz Sharif, as he is wont to do, came out strongly in support of Zardari’s visit to India. No one else has really made a fuss either way. This is to be commended.

This relates to a point I’ve made before about the distortionary effects the khakis have on our domestic and foreign politics. Imagine a world where our military did not have the preferences or power that it does. Obviously we do not live in that world, but for the purposes of a physics-style thought experiment, just imagine it. Now, what do you think our foreign policy towards India would look like? Consider that none of our major parties really has a problem with India. In a world where only our political parties are responsible for policy, I can assure you said policy would look very different. (The contrast with our American policy, by the way, is quite instructive. In a world with no khakis, our American policy would be as, if not more, strident than it is today).

Now, it’s important to not go too far on this. A peace-process is a two way street and anti-settlement lobbies exist on both sides of the border, to be sure. Plus, even so-called low-hanging fruit are not easy to pick off.

But we can only control what we can control. And as I’ve argued before, the gains from a stable relationship accrue to Pakistan a lot more than they do to India. Put differently, it’s a bigger national interest for us than it is for them. The hope/plan would be that gains on smaller issues (visas, cricket, etc) engender levels of trust in a shadow-of-the-future sense that make bigger, more difficult issues slightly more doable.

3. Domestic politics, domestic politics, domestic politics. We’ve seen this movie before and it’s ended badly because of domestic politics. By all accounts, Musharraf and Manmohan were this close to something substantial on Kashmir. What happened? The Chief Justice, May 12, and the moment was lost. Nawaz Sharif and Vajpayee also made substantial progress. What happened? Uh, this.

With elections in Pakistan in about a year, and the Congress government in India getting hammered recently from a number of angles, the tenuousness of this process is made abundantly clear. Then there’s other unpredictable factors: another LeT attack in a major Indian city, complications in Afghanistan as a result of the American retreat, the possibility of a conflict in Iran spiraling out of control, and so on. These are things states and their representatives cannot predict.

The earthquake is the result of the rulers’ sinful policies.

They wanted the women to abandon hijab; run with men nude in bikinis; and learn dance and music. They were not afraid of Allah but (US President George) Bush. At his (Bush‘s) behest, they wanted to purge our schoolbooks from verses on jihad; befriend India and recognise Israel.

They banned all the jihadi outfits and abandoned jihad. They made jihad an abusive term.

They wanted all the Pakistanis to adopt the ‘get-up’ of Bush. They blatantly ridiculed the commandments of Allah. Thus they invited the wrath of God in the form of the earthquake.

Stretching the definition of "professor" a tad, no? Photo: AP

Anyway, I just have a couple of points to make about all the Hafiz Saeed news over the last few days:

1. I don’t know what the point of the bounty was. It has no meaningful effect on anything important whatsoever.

2. I understand that our government is redeploying the all-too-familiar trope of needing “evidence” to arrest Hafiz Saeed. I really wish we wouldn’t do this. It’s really stupid, it makes the people saying it sound stupid, and it makes all 180 million of us look stupid. I wish we lived in a world where our leaders could just say: “Look, we’re not opening another front against another militant organization right now, because we have enough going on as it is. Furthermore, we’re definitely not going to do anything against an organization that still figures very deeply in our (khakis’) strategic thinking on India. Finally, even if we wanted to do something against him, we could not  because judges and lawyers have absolutely no appetite to take these guys head on, because if they do, they end up dead or in exile.” In short, I wish our government would lie less, both to us and the rest of the world.

The first stage is a disbelief seeped in pessimism. You think “yes, nice, a few wins, but there will be more season ending injuries than trophies this year.”

The next stage is elation/joy: “Wow, trophies, awesome!”

The next stage is evangelizing. You try to convince everyone how good your team is, how they’re redefining the sport. You defend them in blogs, in comment sections, on Twitter, and so on. This phase is weird, because while you’re enjoying the winning, there’s something nagging and gnawing at you. WHY DOESN’T EVERYONE RECOGNIZE THE BRILLIANCE.

The next stage is fists-up-defending. This is when the backlash has started, and you have to guard against accusations that your team only wins because of referees. You point to decisions that went against your team, just to show it’s not one-way traffic. Like when Arsenal fans point to Van Persie’s red card, and you remind them of Messi’s disallowed goal in the first leg, or an incorrectly denied penalty in the second leg. This is a horrible phase, and sucks the fun out of sports. If you are ever lucky enough to support a team that kills everyone, just jump over this phase, if you can.

The fifth and final phase is acceptance. You understand that not everyone will like you, so you don’t bother trying to convince them. If people doubt the bases of your team’s success, let them. It is at this point that you realize that it’s unlikely Pep Guardiola and Leo Messi stay awake at night wondering what internet trolls — and Mourinho, who shares a great deal with them — say, so you shouldn’t bother either. Simply put, haters will be haters.

Well, over the last few months, I have entered stage 5, and I have to tell you, it’s bloody awesome. Now when irrational fans complain about penalties given to Barcelona that are, um, fouls in the box, and completely forget about penalties denied to Barcelona that were, um, fouls in the box NOT SIX DAYS AGO, I welcome it. It tells me that they’ve completely run out of things to say.

Just for the record, pulling someone’s shirt in the box is a penalty. It’s not even one of those “I’ve seen them given” things. It’s a penalty, full stop. The fact that those types of penalties aren’t given more often — again, one should have been given last week — is not the fault of the guy who calls it correctly. It’s the fault of the guy who doesn’t give it, incorrectly.

If you don’t like Barcelona, that’s obviously your prerogative. But don’t make stupid arguments in your attempt to minimize their excellence. There is no UEFA conspiracy. Refs do not help Barcelona in Europe. Barca have been winning over the last few years because they happen to be better than other football sides during that time. Sorry to break it to you.

(By the way, stage 6 is nostalgic depression, as your team begins to suck. Thankfully this stage hasn’t hit yet.)

ROME: The long standing and once highly publicised case of acid victim Fakhra Younus met its tragic end on March 17 when she jumped to her death in the Italian city of Rome. Her body is due to reach Karachi on Sunday, Express News reported.

Yunus, wife of former Member of Provincial Assembly Bilal Khar, had been undergoing treatment for acid scarred tissue, including multiple corrective surgeries in Rome.

[...]

In 1998, Yunus was an 18 year old resident of Napier Road’s Bulbul Bazar, Karachi’s red light district, when she met the then Muzaffargarh MPA Bilal Khar.

They both got married after a six month relationship. This was Bilal’s third marriage, while Yunus had a three year old son from an earlier liaison.

Little did Yunus know, that this was not meant to be her fairytale marriage, since shortly after the marriage, she faced both physical and mental abuse by Khar, which lasted for three years before she eventually escaped and moved in with her mother.

An infuriated Khar, with his bruised ego, took ‘revenge’ by pouring acid over her on May 14, 2000, as her five-year-old son watched. The attack left her severely burned, particularly her face. She, however, survived the attack but not before spending three months in intensive care.

Khar used his political influence to evade arrest and absconded, while Yunus’s family faced difficulty in registering an FIR against him.

On October 31, 2002, Khar was eventually arrested, but released in 2003 on Rs 200,000 bail.

To recap: one acid-burn victim leaped to her death. One acid-burn perpetrator sits comfortably in his home. And one-acid burn perpetrator’s cousin is presenting prizes to a documentarian whose Oscar-winning film was about acid-burning women.

Photo via The News

There’s something very wrong with this picture, both literally and metaphorically.

To be clear, I don’t mean to indict or implicate Hina Rabbani Khar for her cousin’s crimes. Maybe deep in her heart she hates her cousin and what he did. We cannot know. But frankly, I’m not terribly interested in knowing what’s going on deep in her heart. (Update: For the record, here’s what Sharmeen Obaid Chinoy tweeted about HRK: “she was most concerned about acid violence saying she had a personal connection- v genuine”).

Incidentally, this type of thing is exactly why a lot of Pakistanis get angry when fashion shows and Birkin bags are taken as synonymous with liberty in the western press. It’s not just to be snarky to incurious and lazy western journalists. It’s because we know these people inside out. We know how Birkin owners think and act away from the cameras. They are, as a general rule, some of the most illiberal people you will find in our country.

For those unaware, the title of this post explained. (Update II: And on the subject of Tehmina Durrani, please make sure to read her op-ed in The News on Fakhra Younis and her suicide. Link via Shahid Saeed).

Update III: And via ExTrib, please watch Mr. Bilal Khar claim his innocence, argue that Fakhra killed herself because she had no money rather than the acid attack, use the word “kanjar” at least three times on national television, plea for understanding based on his having three daughters (what would he do if one of them married someone like himself?), and channel the Musharrafian argument that women in Pakistan are good with violence because it guarantees foreign visas and donor money.

Update IV: Please sign (and share) this petition demanding justice for Fakhra Younis and all acid-attack victims in Pakistan.

Obviously, this is a bit of a crude synopsis of the literature. But I would argue it’s a basically accurate picture. Very, very few social scientists ascribe to primordialist views of identity.

As I said, it’s fascinating that this view enjoys such widespread acceptance. Not because I think it’s wrong (I don’t; I think it’s completely right, like most other social scientists do). No, my fascination stems from the inability of this view to have seeped into the popular imagination.

Perhaps the point can be made better by pointing to how this is different to other similar findings. Think about the Democratic Peace theory. Or the states-that-trade-don’t-fight theory. Or terrorists-aren’t-crazy-people-motivated-by-72-virgins theory. Or states-balance-because-of-capabilities-and-threats theory. Each of these beliefs have found their way, one way or the other, into newspaper reports, op-ed columns, and the wider public. People are aware of them and cite them in causal conversation (often unwittingly, but the point remains). On the other hand, I literally can’t recall any mainstream journalist or intellectual espousing the view that their national identity is all made up, and not some ontological given.You’ll never see Tom Friedman cite Benedict Anderson or Ernest Gellner, that’s for sure.

Another way of saying this would be: the distance between academic beliefs and popular beliefs is much wider when it comes to the question of national identity than most topics.

Of course, this raises the question of why this disjuncture exists as it does. The cynical answer would be that states have been so good at policing the discourse and indoctrinating their citizens, that those citizens are unwilling and unable to grasp that they’ve been told lies upon lies about who they are, and why they are who they are. I don’t know if that’s true though it strikes me as plausible.

It’s no coincidence that I’m writing this post on March 23. I’m sorry, but I find all this patriotism stuff quite silly. I don’t celebrate August 14, March 23, or any other date the state deems important. It makes no sense to me, though of course I can perfectly see why others would disagree. I’m not claiming my national identity box is completely empty. If it was, I wouldn’t care about cricket beyond its sporting importance, or wouldn’t care about Pakistan being a better place to live tomorrow than it is today, and I assure you that I do. But it’s probably emptier than most people’s.

It was kind of weird watching that. I don’t know, my reactions are sort of all over the place.

First of all, many people (including me) have been asking and demanding that Amir apologize to Pakistan and the wider cricketing world. The basic idea being that forgiveness can only follow contrition. And yet, I felt no real catharsis when I heard Amir repeatedly and profusely apologize in the last few minutes. I felt more sad than anything. Look, speaking for myself, I have no problem with “forgiving” Amir (if he cared). It’s got nothing to do with that. I just thought I would feel lighter if and when I heard Amir apologize, and I don’t, for whatever reason.

Second, I don’t know who this Ali chap is, why Amir exchanged texts with him about money, how he knows Salman Butt and Mazhar Majeed, and how it all ties together. Frankly, I couldn’t be bothered trying to figure it out. I don’t want to play detective with this stuff. All I know is, I don’t believe Amir one bit when he says he didn’t do it for the money, or that money played no role in all this. I know people are complicated, and I know there are myriad, complex motivations for each action that we as individuals take, but come on… I wasn’t born yesterday. Watch him at 12:10 of the first video, with his arms crossed and the gulp he takes before responding. I’m no KGB interrogator but even I know that is body-language speak for “I’m lying! I’m lying!”

Third, I miss him. I thankfully slept through Kohli throwing us around like a rag-doll yesterday. I would’ve liked to see him try against Amir. Wahab and Cheema are one thing, Amir is another. You can argue until you’re blue in the face on whether he deserves to be back and what type of cricketer he could be after five years of banishment. All I’m saying is that I’d like to see what happens when he returns, and I’d like to see him get a shot. He made a mistake. He’s paying his due to society for the next four years. We need to stop baying for revenge as if he’s some warlord who wiped out a village.

Fourth, one thing that is very clear from the video is just how inept the international (and Pakistani) cricketing establishment is at educating youngsters. If you follow other sports, as I do, you know that rookies and youngsters from all socioeconomic backgrounds are force fed information on who they should hang out with, how to handle their money, how to talk to the press, and so on. This is Intro to International Sports 101. And yet none of our players, at least until the fall of 2010, went through any of this, and the consequences are painfully clear. It doesn’t take much, you know. An annual 2 week seminar led by former cricketers, coaches, and agents for all cricketers between the ages of 16 and 21 on the verge of representing Pakistan could not possibly be a serious logistical challenge.

Fifth, Salman Butt, you are a haraamzaada of the highest order.

An Afghan woman, center, clad in burqa walks past a soldier at a checkpoint following Sunday's killing of civilians by a U.S. soldier in Kandahar province, south of Kabul, Afghanistan. Pic: AP.

I recall that when Congresswoman Griffords was shot and almost killed, a number of news outlets in the U.S. (fairly) asked the question of the extent to which Sarah Palin and her rhetoric of “targeting” certain lawmakers mattered. The reasoning was simple: that while one cannot directly “blame” Palin for the assassination attempt, violent and dehumanizing rhetoric plays a part in the ways in which others are perceived, and that this perception in turn has real, empirical consequences.

Predictably, the U.S. media is taking great pains to remind us that the Staff Sergeant responsible for the war crime in Afghanistan yesterday had mental and marital problems. The U.S. military might ask itself how somebody of that nature was “routinely tested” for brain injury as well as mental health screening and managed to pass those tests. Be that as it may, I would just note that this may have been a shocking incident but, hand on heart, it is not a surprising one.

We must remind ourselves sometimes that the American military is an American institution filled with Americans. That’s obviously a trivial point, but worth remembering. Because in America today, Islam arouses deep suspicion and hatred. Polls show that Americans feel more prejudice against Muslims than adherents of any other religion. Half of Americans polled (the true number is surely larger) don’t want a mosque built in their neighborhood. This is a country in which “he’s a secret Muslim” counts as a smear, not a mere inaccuracy. This is a country in which people leave these types of comments on internet stories on the war crime yesterday. This is a country in which Muslims are profiled by its largest police force, with the full backing of the mayor of its largest city. This is a country with two parties, one of which simply hates Muslims (good luck finding someone who watched the Republican debates who disagrees with that statement).

If I had an audience with the media members who drew connections between Palin’s rhetoric and the violence committed in Arizona, I would ask them: what makes this different? (Nothing.)

Violent and dehumanizing rhetoric has consequences. Maybe not as severe as when Griffords was shot – it’s only “towel heads” and “sand niggers” who were killed yesterday – but severe nonetheless. I’d venture to suggest the median member of the U.S. military is not terribly far in his or her views towards Muslims than the median citizen of the U.S. Thinking of this man’s actions as somehow separate, distinct, and disconnected from the wider society from which he emanates is wrongheaded, convenient, and stupid.

The unnamed soldier, thought to be a staff sergeant, is reported to have walked off his base at around 03:00 local time (22:30 GMT Saturday).

He then made his way to the villages of Alkozai and Najeeban, about 500m (yds) from the base.

A local resident, Abdul Baqi, told the Associated Press news agency the soldier had apparently opened fire in three different houses.

“When it was happening in the middle of the night, we were inside our houses,” he said. “I heard gunshots and then silence and then gunshots again.”

In one house in Najeeban, the gunman reportedly killed 11 people, setting fire to their bodies before he left.

A relative of the 11 victims, Haji Samad, told Reuters news agency chemicals had been poured over the bodies and set alight.

“I saw that all 11 of my relatives were killed, including my children and grandchildren,” he added, weeping.

An unnamed woman witness in Najeeban told BBC News she had heard gunfire at about 02:00. A barking dog was shot dead by the gunman, she said.

She added that the Taliban had not been seen in the area for five months.

At least three of the child victims were killed by a single shot to the head, the BBC’s Quentin Sommerville reports from Kabul.

Naturally, we are going to hear about how this was a “rogue” soldier, “acting alone”, and how his actions don’t reflect the wider institution to which he belongs. Obama’s press statement certainly touched upon that theme, saying that “this incident is tragic and shocking, and does not represent the exceptional character of our military and the respect that the United States has for the people of Afghanistan.”

Sorry, but that’s rubbish. It was only last year when the infamous “kill team” story came out (the details of that story, too, have to be read to be believed). It’s only been a couple of months since the “urinating on corpses” story came out. You wonder about the stories we haven’t heard about. The U.S military may embody a lot of things but a deep respect for the people of Afghanistan is probably not one of them.

The poor bastard went down the rabbit hole and was neutralized.

ISI is fully infiltrated by sympathizers and operatives. So, he was killed by ISI. Will we find a smoking gun? No. Will anybody care about this dude? Not really. The Agency lost an asset. Life goes on. There is a reason the CIA set up unilateral operations in Pakistan.

Suggest everyone read David Ignatius new book on CIA NOC and front company operations in Pakistan. Once again, he has gotten dead right.

As well as this bit:

The most interesting aspect is the killing of a journalist. Fine line between an investigative journalist and spy. When you rattle around topics nobody wants aired, you pay the price. Truth tellers always get shot. Its much easier to lie or make up stories.

I honestly don’t understand how these two emails can be taken as proof of anything. My main point would be that just because somebody says something in an email — somebody far removed, I may add — does not make it true. As Dan Drezner helpfully notes in another Stratfor/WikiLeaks post, “people can BS in private too.”

Now, am I prepared to completely dismiss the possibility that Shahzad was once on the payroll of the ISI, or the CIA, or both? No. But that is because I’ve seen too much crazy stuff happen in the recent past, stuff which seemed implausible and stupid at first glance. Lack of reliable information is a problem in most wars, but in a region where almost nobody ventures, and in a war conducted almost entirely in secret, I’m really not prepared to make blanket claims one way or the other.

But these emails can’t be taken as evidence, one way or the other. Wikileaks often turns up interesting and valuable information but this, I’m afraid, does not qualify. Sometimes an email is just an email. If you don’t believe me, go back and read the last 10 emails you wrote from your personal account, as well as the last 10 emails you wrote from your work account, and ask yourself whether you would want the entire world poring over the hidden meaning contained within those emails.

Of course, I did enjoy a link to my blog contained in those emails, which means I have finally arrived. Gotta thank Ali Dayan for that one.

Update/correction: It appears I missed the smokiest of the “smoking gun” on Shahzad’s CIA connections (thanks to Shahid for pointing it out). Here’s the particular email:

I’m sure the ISI extracted a confession of his CIA work before he died. There will be a leaked story about his double agent work and the Pakis rub the CIA’s nose in it. Its what intel agencies do. Tit for tat. The world will soon forget him. Price one pays for playing the game.

Still don’t think this constitutes “evidence” but it’s worth noting.

Exhibit A is the Tahaffuz Namoos-e-Risalat Mahaz protesting the presence of women running in a marathon organized by the Punjab government. Why? I’ll let them explain it:

What sort of a message does the Punjab government want to give by bringing women on roads like this? We will definitely protest recorded tomorrow, now that we have decided to stand up to them.” Muhammad Ali Naqshbandi, the General Secretary TNRM told The Express Tribune.

Naqshbandi added that, “This practice of women running is against Quran and Sunnah, women are not even allowed to walk fast around Ka’aba.”

Indeed. I have no doubt that violence will be either explicitly or implicitly threatened, and I have no doubt that the authorities will back down, just as they did in 2005.

Exhibit B is the Senate (congrats to the PPP on their gains, by the way) condemning the Quran burning in Afghanistan at the hands of U.S. forces:

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan’s upper house of parliament on Tuesday passed a unanimous resolution condemning the burning of Quran’s at a US base in Afghanistan and demanding that those responsible be punished.

“This house demands investigation and punishment for those who were responsible for this deplorable act,” the resolution said, passed four days after elections widened the main ruling party’s representation in the Senate.

“Nato will have to take steps to stop such irresponsible acts in the future,” added the resolution, presented by Nayyar Bukhari, leader in the Senate from President Asif Ali Zardari’s Pakistan People’s Party.

I thought pandering took place before an election, not after?

Anyway, Exhibit C is my favorite. The Punjab Assembly has passed a resolution, unanimously no less, for the teaching of the Quran to be mandatory in all public and private institutions.

LAHORE: A resolution supporting mandatory teaching of the Quran, with translation and comprehension, in all public and private educational institutions was passed, unanimously, on Tuesday by the Punjab Assembly.

The mover of the resolution, Pakistan Muslim League-Functional’s (PML-F) Dr Asma Mamdot, said young people had no knowledge of Quran’s teachings. She said that she planned on moving a bill in the house soon.

[...]

The resolution presented by Mamdot said that the house was of the opinion that the teaching of Quran should be made mandatory in all educational institutions in order to “sensitise” the young generation. It called for making Quran lessons part of the syllabus, starting from grade 1 and continuing till professional degrees. The Punjab government was also asked to allocate funds for teaching of Quran.

Mamdot later told The Express Tribune that madrassas’ interpretation of the Quran was turning children into terrorists. She said she believed that terrorism would be eliminated from the country if Quran was made part of school and college curriculum.

Where to start? First, if there is a causal relationship between levels of religiosity and terrorism in Pakistan, I am not sure it is an inverse one, as the good doctor claims. Second, if someone can point me to the pedagogical purpose of this — when all students in Pakistan already study Islamiat — I’d like to hear it.

As I said, Islam could not have hoped for a better and more dedicated thekedar than Pakistan. A great honor and privilege it is, too.

PESHAWAR: At least 55 people were killed Friday in violence in Pakistan’s troubled northwestern tribal region of Kyhber, which borders Afghanistan, local officials said.

Twenty-two people were killed in a suicide attack targeting a mosque after Friday prayers in the Tirah valley, while at least 10 soldiers and 23 militants died in an earlier clash around 10 kilometres away (six miles).

Fifteen militants were also killed when Pakistan fighter jets blitzed various suspected militant hideouts in the Orakzai Agency.

The second is the report on Ahmedis not being allowed to enter a mosque because local residents would rather have them not do so:

RAWALPINDI: Complying with the demands of the locals, the police on Friday barred Ahmadis from entering their worship centre in Satellite Town, Rawalpindi.

Leading the locals, businessman Sharjeel Mir told The Express Tribune that three days back on a consensus, it was decided to prevent any sort of worship in the centre.

Mir said that at a meeting called by the locals which was attended by DCO Saqib Zafar, Superintendent of Police Matloob Hussain, ulemas and other officials, it was decided that the worship centre will now be used only as a residence and if their demands are not met, then they will launch a protest.

The third is the report on the PTA’s efforts to ban the internet, owing to, amongst other things, national security:

The government published a public tender last month for the “development, deployment and operation of a national-level URL filtering and blocking System.” Technology companies, academic institutions and other interested parties have until March 16 to submit proposals for the $10 million project — but anger about it has been growing both inside and outside Pakistan.

Censorship of the Web is nothing new in Pakistan, which, like other countries in the region, says it wants to uphold public morality, protect national security or prevent blasphemy. The government has blocked access to pornographic sites as well as, from time to time, mainstream services like Facebook and YouTube, Google’s video site.

Reading these reports in conjunction leads to the following propositions:

1. Sometimes suicide bombers have an easier time entering mosques than Ahmedis trying to pray.

2. Our national security is not just threatened by brutal militant groups but also by Facebook.

3. Facebook and porn are blasphemous but  forbidding people to pray in their mosques is not.

I don’t believe that Imran Khan actually believes this, but I can see why he would say it. But leaving aside the time limits the PTI is setting itself, it is worth noting that the PTI, at this point, has no experience in getting anything done. This is not intended as a criticism of the party at all; for many (most?) of their supporters, the lack of experience in governing is the most attractive thing about PTI.

My point is only that parties don’t just magically get things done in Pakistan. This is especially true in today’s Pakistan, where the stakeholders are too disparate and too great in number for an actor to just snap his or her fingers and have them agree. Forget the bureaucracy or the army for a second. Let’s just limit ourselves to parliamentary procedures. Even there, assuming a minority/coalition government at the center (a safe assumption), you’ve got to have other parties agree with you to get stuff passed.

When you look at the PPP, for instance, it’s shown a remarkable ability to get other parliamentary stakeholders on board for its legislation, from the 18th amendment to the 20th amendment, amongst others. This agreement is not born of accident. It doesn’t come from people saying, “Oh, the government proposed this? Let’s get on board immediately!”

Being a national party for almost fifty years has endowed the PPP hierarchy with an institutional memory and skill set that favors it. One does not have to like the game to appreciate that the PPP is good at playing it.

Don't hate the player. Photo: AP

Quite obviously, the PTI does not have this institutional memory. If, for instance, they were leading a coalition government, and the PML(N) suddenly made an about-turn as it did in the run-up the 18th amendment, would they know how to react and get the legislation passed? Or would it blow up in their face as they tried to bully themselves through? Would they be able to cajole the MQM when it needed to, as the PPP has? Keep one party (the ANP) in its pocket the whole time, without any serious threat of defection?

I want to reiterate that this, unlike many of my other posts on the PTI, is not intended as a criticism. I’m merely pointing out that compromise, exchange, and reading-and-reacting is an essential part of a political party’s repertoire when in charge of a country as fractured as Pakistan. These are acquired skills and come from experiencing the halls of power and opposition over generations. If I was a true dedicated supporter of the PTI and Imran Khan, this is one thing that would concern me. It’s all very well having the best of intentions and a can-do mentality. But practicing power is a little bit more complicated than that.

Photo: Reuters

Also, kudos to her for her fantastic speech, which wasn’t long or rambling or self-involved or stupid, unlike 95% of these acceptance speeches. She was graceful and classy and concise and inspiring. It was really great to see.

I remember talking to my late brother about this stuff, and he impressed upon me the importance of tumult, either personal or social, for the creative process. His basic point was that without underlying tension of some sort that gnaws at the creator, art is usually bad. If nothing else, women having acid thrown in their face and a doctor trying to make those faces “normal” speaks to a particular type of tension. What I mean by that is that there is a certain type of man who feels okay throwing acid on a woman’s face, and there is a certain type of man that dedicates his life, in part, to doing what he can to help the victims of those attacks recover. Those two conceptions of how a man is obliged to behave are, obviously, in tension. I really look forward to watching the doc to see that in action.

Congrats again to Sharmeen, her family, and the rest of the crew behind “Saving Face”.

As Ayaz Amir noted in his column,

The 20th Amendment is a bit of a minor miracle – ensuring an independent election commission and neutral caretaker setups, going so far as to stipulate that if agreement fails between government and opposition on caretaker names, the final word will lie with the chief election commissioner. If this doesn’t stop the cry of election-rigging in Pakistan nothing ever will.

To the PML-N goes the principal credit for giving final shape to this amendment. It pushed long and hard and finally had its way. This was a far cry from its earlier stand when dark hints were thrown about resigning from the assemblies and forcing early elections. Different voices are often heard in the PML-N but ultimately, as we keep seeing, pragmatism prevails. The Memogate petition in the Supreme Court was an exception, good sense taking a back seat, but no point in pouring salt over an open wound.

The prime minister and his team, especially Khurshid Shah, also deserve credit for showing patience and not losing their cool, and not losing sight of the larger picture. Failure to agree on the 20th Amendment could have jeopardized much more, including the Senate election.

This goes along with a theme I’ve touched upon repeatedly during the last couple years. Namely, that there is a serious disjuncture in this government’s ability to get things done. The capital-p Politics stuff, they’re excellent at. The 18th amendment, marking the first time a head of state in Pakistan gave up power and privileges, for instance. Allowing political parties in FATA. The Balochistan package. The Gilgit-Baltistan reforms. The anti-women violence bill. And now the 20th amendment. On some major institutional and constitutional issues, they’ve done a good job. What they’re seriously bad at is the stuff that impacts people’s day-to-day lives, like the energy crisis or law and order.

To return to the main point of the post, the 20th amendment is an important achievement. You would think Imran Khan would be behind it, given his rhetoric in the past. After all, he’s said things like

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf Chairman Imran Khan declared that no general election would be tolerated prior to rectification of bogus electoral lists.

Addressing a joint press conference along with Air Marshal (r) Asghar Khan of Tehreek-e-Istaqlal (TI) on Monday at the latter’s residence, he announced his strong resolve to struggle for an independent Election Commission

He said that he was the man who had introduced neutral umpires in cricket and would also continue his efforts for an independent Election Commission.

So when the cause of independent election commission is served, why is this his reaction?

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) chairperson Imran Khan said on Tuesday that the 20th Amendment was stacked up against his party in particular because PTI was becoming a real electoral threat to both, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N).

“The 20th Amendment was just passed by the PPP and PML-N to strengthen their hold on power and to prevent PTI from sweeping the next general elections,” said Khan.

Strongly rejecting the amendment, Khan said that PML-N continues to support the wrongdoings of the government so that both the PPP and PML-N could have a share in the corrupt power structures prevailing at present.

Calling it a fraud and violation of the Constitution and democratic principles, Imran said the amendment condones elections carried out against the provisions of the Constitution.

“A complete fraud has been committed by the government in collusion with the main opposition party,” Imran stated.

Really? “A complete fraud?” That’s your opinion?

Always ripe for a head-scratching comment, Immy is. Photo: AP

It’s obvious that Imran Khan is being disingenuous here. Even he can’t be that stupid. He obviously believes this is a good step in the right direction, but refuses to say so because he can’t bring himself to say anything remotely nice about the PPP and PML-N. It’s a little churlish and a little immature.

Memo to PTI: sometimes your political opponents do worthy things. A quiet nod of appreciation, even amidst the cacophony of Pakistani politics, would not be remiss.