One other response has been the forming of Thai Spring. The Nation:

This dissatisfaction with the prime minister’s speech has led to the formation of a new group called Thai Spring.

Members have been collecting signatures of those who disagree with the contents of the speech, while the group has also published an open letter detailing Thaksin’s alleged misdeeds that they say warranted the coup and.

The letter also attacks the Yingluck government, calling it a dictatorial regime that is perpetuating the power of the Shinawatra family. It also attacked Yingluck personally, saying she was merely a puppet of her brother.

Thai Spring is modelled after the Arab Spring pro-democracy movement in North Africa and the Middle East. The Arab Spring movement spread across the region and dictatorial regimes were toppled in countries including Libya, Tunisia and Egypt. In others, such as Syria, a bloody conflict is still ongoing.

Two founding members of Thai Spring are well-known figures – Kaewsan Atibodhi and former chief of the Royal Court Security Police Vasit Dejkunjorn. They are known to have close ties to the Democrat Party and previously participated in protests against the current government. They are also known to be close to the Siam Samakkhi group, which has held seminars critical of the government.

BP: Kaewsan is a long-time critic of Thaksin – see here, here, and here - from his PAD days to his time investigating Thaksin after the coup and to involvement with other anti-Thaksin groups.

However, reading the letter “Community of Democracies”, you get a few “interesting” comparisons with North Korea:

Ms. Yingluck’s assumption of office to continue and perpetuate her family’s dominance is no different from that of Mr. Kim Jong Il’s continuation of his family’s control over North Korea [BP: cough every election since 2001 cough contrast with North Korea]. Ms. Yingluck’s tenure is totally dependent on the wishes and orders of her brother, Thaksin Shinawatra.

…

Successes at past general elections were simply legalizing acts of authorization of this authoritarian family to gain power, to capture and subjugate the country. If your Excellencies were to be more judicious and scrutinizing you would have found out that the Shinawatra-owned Pheu Thai Party is full of stooges in the guise of Members of Parliament. They are no different from members of the Communist Party of North Korea.

The Thai media in general behave in a similarly subservient manner, being commissioned by the Shinawatra family to create personality cults and promote public adoration for themselves. They behave no differently from the North Korean media.

If you pay a visit to North Korea you will witness the omnipresence of portraits of the leader. In Thailand it is the same. These two likeminded families have thus been sending their followers and subordinates to infiltrate all strata of their respective societies.

BP: Yes, Marshall and Saksith have already pointed out the North Korea comments previously, but you really have to read these bolded and underlined parts again and think about them more carefully. It is not a parody. This is really their open letter. Do they really understand what a personality cult is? Wikipedia:

A cult of personality arises when an individual uses mass media, propaganda, or other methods, to create an idealized, heroic, and, at times god-like public image, often through unquestioning flattery and praise.

…

Throughout history, monarchs and heads of state were almost always held in enormous reverence. Through the principle of the divine right of kings, for example, rulers were said to hold office by the will of God. Ancient Egypt, Japan, the Inca, the Aztecs, Tibet, Thailand, and the Roman Empire (see imperial cult) are especially noted for redefining monarchs as god-kings.

…

Often, a single leader became associated with this revolutionary transformation, and came to be treated as a benevolent “guide” for the nation without whom the transformation to a better future couldn’t occur. This has been generally the justification for personality cults that arose in totalitarian societies of the 20th century, such as those of Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin.

BP: Is it the case in Thailand, that there is “unquestioning flattery and praise” of Thaksin and Yingluck?   Are portraits of Thaksin or Yingluck so widespread like those of Kim Jong Il? It is not pictures of Thaksin or Yingluck that are widespread in Thailand. 

Is this some kind of Bizarro World?

* their dig at the Thai media as being subservient is amusing…. but subservient to Thaksin and Yingluck. Has there ever been a day over the last six years where if you looked at the front page of every newspaper that wasn’t at least one critical comment in one paper of Thaksin or Yingluck on the frontpage?

The issue was not over as Yingluck told her lawyers to file a complaint. The Nation:

The lawyers filed the complaint against the cartoonist at Dusit police station on Friday afternoon.

They charged Chai with three counts – insulting an official during an operation, defaming another person via publicity and violating the Computerrelated Crime Act, which prohibits posting defamatory comments against others on Internet

BP: BP has long viewed that such criminal defamation suits are a bad, and sometimes stupid, idea – see here and here. BP is also strongly opposed to defamation being criminal regardless of who is being sued – see here and here.

On all levels, this lawsuit is politically a very bad idea:

1. Most people are unknown to wider society and when the are defamed publicly the opinions that people have of that person, particularly those who didn’t know them before, will be formed. One of the purposes of defamation law is to set the record straight i.e. to correct the wrong. For public figures, the situation is not the same. Many people have already formed an opinion of someone who is so prominent. Yes, some attacks can hurt people’s reputation, but many of the attacks against Yingluck haven’t and have backfired? If anything, the insults directed at Yingluck over the past few years have not hurt her popularity.  Interestingly, Chalerm, of all people, recognized this as per this tweet from Veena of The Nation:

Chalerm, on YL being attacked, The more she is attacked, the more popular she would be.

BP: Would agree to the extent that the attacks are insults particularly directly or indirectly stating that Yingluck is a slut/less than wholesome women – see here, here, and (to a much lesser extent) here. The best example of this was last year when the Democrats suffered a drop – it was a short drop – in public support and this coincided with attacks on Yingluck by some Democrats implying that Yingluck was having an extra-marital affair. Yingluck didn’t respond at all at the time which BP viewed infuriated some critics and led them to increase the suggestions of an affair until they eventually gave up because of the political fall-out of the comments.  As noted in the post at the time:

Sometimes,  silence makes more political sense. One could easily say that Obama could have silenced critics of him not being born in the US earlier by releasing the long-form birth certificate earlier, but by delaying he allowed the crazies to come out and this became a welcome distraction as it made the other side look bad.

BP: Of course, the birth certificate analogy doesn’t work completely as Obama can laugh about that, but in a country like Thailand (despite the large prostitution industry) which is still very conservative when it comes to sex, it wouldn’t be possible for Yingluck to laugh at it so silence/ignoring it would be the best policy. Of course, ignoring it completely may be difficult as reporters would likely ask questions, but there are ways to respond without filing a lawsuit.

2. The lawsuit – aside from what Anudith has said (that is for a later post) – also diverted attention away from the cartoonist. As BP stated in 2007, the cartoonist, Chai Ratchawatr, is (or perhaps, “had been”) the most influential cartoonist but as Thai politics has become more polarized BP is no longer sure it is the case. Interestingly, back in 2009, his neutrality was being raised in an article in The Nation when the Democrats filed a complaint against Thai Rath‘s other cartoonist:

In a press conference on Sunday, Satit said Sia’s cartoons were clearly biased against the PM and the Democrat Party.

“Sia did not exercise media ethics and professionalism in his work. He did not offer a professional, honest criticism or offer his opinions in a creative manner so it would lead to a straightforward consumption of news. He did not use his intellect either at a time when the country is facing problems,” he said. “I ask for Sia to be fair, unbiased, professional, ethical and work within media standards.”

He said he would put forward a compilation of pieces done by Sia when he filed complaint with the National Press Council of Thailand.

However, his remarks did not stop Sia from expressing his opinion. Yesterday’s cartoon showed Abhisit sitting in his chair with the messages “it is time a standard label was attached to the chair” and “muzzling the media means muzzling the people” in the background. And as usual, there is a cobra wound around Abhisit’s neck.

Actually, some Thai Rath fans say the newspaper’s cartoons are neutral and balanced by the work of another cartoonist Somchai Katanyutanan or “Chai Ratchawat”.

Chai was criticised by some as supporting the Democrat Party, something he denied. He challenged his fans to find a cartoon done by him that cheered the Democrats, adding that he could easily find one that openly criticised them.

BP: Despite the denials, it was becoming clear at that point that Sia was on one side of the political ledger and Chai on the opposite. Nevertheless, with Chai’s Facebook post it has become some obvious to the point that his cartoons will be seen by some through through the lens of the insult. Sure those on his side of the political divide will cheer on future cartoons that are critical of the government, but independent/swing voters remember the insult when looking at his cartoons (although do think the lawsuit negates this effect somewhat). The insult hurt Chai’s influence with the broader Thai public much more than it hurt Yingluck.

3. Aside from the defamation lawsuits, other complaints have been filed against Chai by the PM’s lawyers including breaching the Computer Crimes Act. This is serious overkill. We can start to draw comparisons with Thaksin and his numerous lawsuits and other actions against the media. The spectre of Thaksin will always be there but Yingluck’s mainly non-confrontational approach and lack of similar lawsuits meant it was clear that Yingluck was taking a different approach with the press. The lawsuit changes that and will hurt Yingluck more than it will ever hurt Chai.

Yingluck should drop the lawsuit..

However, on social media, in some online forums, and in some news articles it has been pointed out that the cartoonist did not mention Yingluck’s name.

The Nation:

Chai, whose real name is Somchai Katanyutanan, posted pictures of Yingluck with a caption: “Please understand that prostitutes are not bad women. Prostitutes only sell their body, but a bad woman has been wandering around trying to sell the country.” However, Chai did not mention whom he meant on the post.

The problem with this argument is if you look at the Facebook Post:

BP: The post consisted on two items; the comment and the photos.  The post states “please understand, whores are not evil. Whores just sell their body, but the evil woman sells [her] country” so it is specifically talking about a woman. Yingluck is not only in all three photos contain Yingluck she is the only women in the photos.

In an interview with the Bangkok Post, the cartoonist specifically states he was referring to the PM in his FB post:

[Q] With the “evil woman” statement, what were you trying to tell people?

[A] It was to imply that the prime minister‘s speech was tantamount to selling the nation. I do not mean selling the national interest. It was more to the effect of making Thai people lose face. It is like losing face from verbal blunders. Speaking negatively about one’s own country is like betraying the nation. It makes foreigners misunderstand Thailand. A leader does not speak about personal matters or a political conflict in public because it is about manners and principles. The prime minister made two mistakes: saying something that was out of place and lying.

BP: So that is cleared.

btw, his thoughts about what constitues betrayal of the nation and the limit on what the PM can speak about are interesting…..

BP: First, on the wording of the insult.

AFP translation:

  “… a prostitute is not an evil person, the hooker only sells body. But an evil woman sells the nation”

The Nation translates it as:

“Please understand that prostitutes are not bad women. Prostitutes only sell their bodies, but a bad woman has been wandering around trying to sell the country.”

The Bangkok Post translates it as:

“Prostitutes are not evil. They just sell their bodies. But an evil woman sells the nation.”

BP: โสเภณี would be translated as prostitute, but กระหรี is a much stronger and impolite term than simply a prostitute. The Royal Institute’s list of new words (p7) defines กระหรี as “โสเภณี (เป็นคำไม่สุภาพ)” or “prostitute (impolite word)”. BP views the closest equivalent in English is “whore”. Hence, BP would translate the FB post as “please understand, whores are not evil. Whores just sell their body, but the evil woman sells [her] country.”

Second, on the level of insult of the term กระหรี, a news story from a few years ago was when one singer/presenter, Jennifer Kim (เจนนิเฟอร์ คิ้ม) called the actress Jik Naowarat (จิ๊ก เนาวรัตน์ ยุกตะนันท์) a กระหรี at a pub opening, but when referring to the story ASTV Manager in their headline don’t even print out the full word – they used “กะ_รี่”. Jik stated she didn’t want to make an issue of it (พี่ไม่เอาเรื่อง), but warned Jennifer Kim that if she said this to others they may have hit her or filed a lawsuit. Jennifer Kim later apologized.

Another news story from a few years ago was when the ex-husband of an actress saying she was acting like a กระหรี for having three new boyfriends within the year. A tabloid, Siam Dara, didn’t even print the full word, just referred to it “กะ_รี่”. The actress stated she was going to sue, but the newspaper called to negotiate so she delayed the lawsuit so an agreement could be worked out.

BP can find numerous other examples of newspapers referring to กระหรี the by not spelling it fully, For example, Sanook and Matichon  (you will see in this article that the word “โสเภณี” meaning prostitute is spelled out in full). These examples are different, but the context is that the meaning of กระหรี is a very serious insult in Thai. It is an impolite term, like some swear words in English which are not spelled out. Now, just think of such words in English that directly refer to a women in English and which would not be printed in full (i.e by replacing one of the vowels with a * – such as b*tch or c*nt, and that gives you a better understanding over the level of the insult. The term “prostitute” does not convey the same meaning.

Third, the evil women who sells the country is the specific insult directed at Yingluck, but it is the use of the term “กระหรี”, particularly that direct implication of the statement is that Yingluck is worse than a whore, which is the more serious insult.

On April 29, Yingluck attended the 7th Ministerial Conference of the Community of Democracies* and below is the text of her speech:

I wish to begin by expressing my appreciation to His Excellency the President of Mongolia for inviting me to speak at this Conference of the Community of Democracies.

I accepted this invitation not only because I wanted to visit a country that has made many achievements regarding democracy, or to exchange ideas and views on democracy. But I am here also because democracy is so important to me, and more importantly, to the people of my beloved home, Thailand.

Democracy is not a new concept. Over the years, it has brought progress and hope to a lot of people. At the same time, many people have sacrificed their blood and lives in order to protect and build a democracy.

A government of the people, by the people and for the people does not come without a price. Rights, liberties and the belief that all men and women are created equal have to be fought, and sadly, died for.

Why? This is because there are people in this world who do not believe in democracy. They are ready to grab power and wealth through suppression of freedom. This means that they are willing to take advantage of other people without respecting human rights and liberties. They use force to gain submission and abuse the power. This happened in the past and still posed challenges for all of us in the present.

In many countries, democracy has taken a firm root. And it is definitely refreshing to see another wave of democracy in modern times, from Arab Spring to the successful transition in Myanmar [Burma] through the efforts of President Thein Sein, and also the changes in my own country where the people power in Thailand has brought me here today.

At the regional level, the key principles in the ASEAN Charter are the commitment to rule of law, democracy and constitutional government. However, we must always beware that anti-democratic forces never subside. Let me share my story.

In 1997, Thailand had a new constitution that was created through the participation from the people. Because of this, we all thought a new era of democracy has finally arrived, an era without the cycle of coups d’état.

It was not to be. An elected government which won two elections with a majority was overthrown in 2006. Thailand lost track and the people spent almost a decade to regain their democratic freedom.

Many of you here know that the government I am talking about was the one with my brother, Thaksin Shinawatra, as the rightfully elected Prime Minister.

Many who don’t know me say that why complain? It is a normal process that governments come and go. And if I and my family were the only ones suffering, I might just let it be.

But it was not. Thailand suffered a setback and lost international credibility. Rule of law in the country was destroyed. Projects and programmes started by my brother’s government that came from the people’s wishes were removed. The people felt their rights and liberties were wrongly taken away.

Thai means free, and the people of Thailand fought back for their freedom. In May 2010, a crackdown on the protestors, the Red Shirts Movement, led to 91 deaths in the heart of the commercial district of Bangkok.

Many innocent people were shot dead by snipers, and the movement crushed with the leaders jailed or fled abroad. Even today, many political victims remain in jail.

However, the people pushed on, and finally the government then had to call for an election, which they thought could be manipulated. In the end, the will of people cannot be denied. I was elected with an absolute majority.

But the story is not over. It is clear that elements of anti-democratic regime still exist. The new constitution, drafted under the coup leaders led government, put in mechanisms to restrict democracy.

A good example of this is that half of the Thai Senate is elected, but the other half is appointed by a small group of people. In addition, the so called independent agencies have abused the power that should belong to the people, for the benefit of the few rather than to the Thai society at large.

This is the challenge of Thai democracy. I would like to see reconciliation and democracy gaining strength. This can only be achieved through strengthening of the rule of law and due process. Only then will every person from all walks of life feel confident that they will be treated fairly. I announced this as part of the government policy at Parliament before I fully assumed my duties as Prime Minister.

Moreover, democracy will also promote political stability, providing an environment for investments, creating more jobs and income. And most importantly, I believe political freedom addresses long-term social disparities by opening economic opportunities that would lead to reducing the income gap between the rich and the poor.

That is why it is so important to strengthen the grassroots. We can achieve this through education reforms. Education creates opportunities through knowledge, and democratic culture built into the ways of life of the people.

Only then will the people have the knowledge to be able to make informed choices and defend their beliefs from those wishing to suppress them. That is why Thailand supported Mongolia’s timely UNGA resolution on education for democracy.

Also important is closing gaps between rich and poor. Everyone should be given opportunities and no one should be left behind. This will allow the people to become an active stakeholder in building the country’s economy and democracy.

That is why my Government initiated policies to provide the people with the opportunities to make their own living and contribute to the development of our society. Some of these include creating the Women Development Fund, supporting local products and SMEs as well as help raising income for the farmers.

And I believe you need effective and innovative leadership. Effective in implementing rule of law fairly. Innovative in finding creative peaceful solutions to address the problems of the people.

You need leadership not only on the part of governments but also on the part of the opposition and all stakeholders. All must respect the rule of law and contribute to democracy.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Another important lesson we have learnt was that international friends matter. Pressure from countries who value democracy kept democratic forces in Thailand alive. Sanctions and non-recognition are essential mechanisms to stop anti-democratic regimes.

An international forum like Community of Democracies helps sustain democracy, seeking to promote and protect democracy through dialogue and cooperation. More importantly, if any country took the wrong turn against the principle of democracy, all of us here need to unite to pressure for change and return freedom to the people.

I will always support the Community of Democracies and the work of the Governing Council. I also welcome the President’s Asian Partnership Initiative for Democracy and will explore how to extend our cooperation with it.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to end my statement by declaring that I hope that the sufferings of my family, the families of the political victims, and the families of the 91 people, who lost their lives in defending democracy during the bloodshed in May 2010, will be the last ["will be the last" emphasis in original].

Let us continue to support democracy so that the rights and liberties of all human beings will be protected for future generations to come!

BP: What is most surprising is that the speech comes almost two years of mostly conciliatory speaking. Below are some comments in the following order of importance:

1. The main audience for the speech was domestic. One part was aimed at the government’s owns supporters. The government has been trying not to do much to upset the establishment, but some of the government’s own supporters want the government to move at a faster pace on constitutional reform and a number of other political issues as well as to take the fight to the establishment. BP wouldn’t say this was aimed at “the base” – to use US political parlance – as not all members of the “Puea Thai base” are more interested in the political programs. A number would prefer more attention to so-called “populist” policies. Nevertheless, for some who support the government, particularly amongst red shirt supporters, the speech was talk of a more direct approach. Will it be matched with more action over time?

2. Another section of the domestic audience this speech was aimed at is the “establishment”. Simply put, the speech seems to indicate, together with the recent refusal of Puea Thai to submit testimony to the Constitution Court over the Court accepting a petition against the proposed rewrite of Section 68 of the Constitution, that the government is no longer willing to continue backing down as they did last year with the constitutional amendments and amnesty.

BP thinks Thaksin’s preference would be for a compromise, but given the last 18 months have seen a number of backdowns from the government, the speech and other recent events/actions is likely meant to be a sign to the establishment that the government will press ahead if a deal cannot be worked out. Will the government actually press ahead of no deal is forthcoming?

3. Part of the speech was aimed at the establishment in another way. That is by speaking to an international audience – see bolded and underlined parts. The speech is trying to build up support for sanctions and other measures if there was another coup. This Brookings paper indicates Thailand was a participant in 2000, 2002, and 2005 conferences, but was “not invited” in 2007 (no doubt because of the 2006 coup and military-installed government at the time). The US Deputy Secretary of State stated at the latest conference “we have established a Governing Council that is truly democratic, enabling the organization to make tough decisions, including the suspension of countries where democracy has seriously faltered”. One example of this was that Mali’s membership with the Community of Democracy was suspended in 2012 after a coup in the country. Obviously, the Community of Democracies is not a well-known organization in Thailand so Thailand’s suspension as a member if there was a coup would not receive much news. Then again, with Yingluck’s speech the Community of Democracies has become more well-known. Nevertheless, it is more of a symbolic message to the establishment, particularly the military, that a military coup would not be looked on favourably by the international community and Thaksin will “fight” this time unlike in 2006.

NOTE: There are a few other issues about the speech that would like to look at in future posts particularly, the “why now?” issue as well as the insult directed at Yingluck by the Thai Rath cartoonist in a Facebook post, the politically ill-advised lawsuit by Yingluck against the cartoonist, and very ill-advised and concerning statements by the ICT Minister about shutting down websites that posted defamatory comments (he seems to have backed down on the comments), but these are issues for other posts.

* There has been a great deal of commentary about what Yingluck said, but less so on the forum that she spoke at. Community of Democracies (CD) website explaining the organization:

The Community of Democracies is a global intergovernmental coalition of democratic countries, with the goal of promoting democratic rules and strengthening democratic norms and institutions around the world.

The Community was initiated by the minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, prof Bronislaw Geremek, and US Secretary of State dr Madeleine Albright, inviting all democratic countries to a conference in Warsaw hosted by Poland in June 2000.The conference gathered ministerial delegations from 106 countries from all over the world, who signed the final declaration, Toward a Community of Democracies , still today the most comprehensive international declaration on democratic values.

Today, well over 100 democratic countries who meet democratic standards participate at ministerial meetings every two years to discuss issues of common concern. The Governing Council is the highest decision-making body and presently consists of 24 member countries. Participants and members of the Community collaborate with each other and with civil society to strengthen democracy in a variety of ways: in the UN Democracy Caucus, in working groups, in missions on the ground and in global initiatives

From the CD website on the  7th Conference theme “…it concluded two years of Mongolian presidency of the Community of Democracies, highlighting the message of democracy on the rise in Asia“.

BP: It would have been unusual if she had not talked about the coup and democracy in Thailand….

US Embassy on the participants of the 7th Conference:

Different Heads of State and Foreign Ministers will take part in the conference, among them the President of Nigeria, Mr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, and Prime Minister of Thailand, Mrs. Yingluck Shinawatra; EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Baroness Catherine Ashton; UN Under-Secretary-General; Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine. The Ministers will interact with leading democracy actors: Nobel Peace Prize Laureates Aung San Suu Kyi and Tawakkol Karman, UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Association, Maina Kiai, heads of the international organizations – International IDEA, OSCE, NDI, IRI and NED – civil society activists from all over the world, members of parliaments and invitees from the private sector.

BP: The G8 or G20 it is not….US Deputy Secretary of State William J. Burns also spoke, but the vast majority of the speakers were not elected heads of state/prime minister level (although we got a video message from Obama) although this meant Yingluck did get a prominent speaking position following the President of Mongolia…

This earlier report on the CD conference by fellow Asian Correspondent writer Michelle Tolson is also worth a read: A tale of two democracies: How Mongolia has outshone Cambodia

Government gross public debt as a % of GDP at the end of February 2013 (the latest figure) is 44.05%. This post will at possible political problems the government may face and particularly at what thresholds problems will likely arise in regards to gross government debt.

The Nation from October 2012 quoting Finance Minister Kittirat on last year’s (October 2012-September 2013) budget:

The new debts will increase public debt to 47.5 per cent of gross domestic product from the current 44.19 per cent. 

“It’s a high amount but it is still below the sustainable level of public debt, set at 60 per cent of GDP. We are committed to fiscal discipline,” Kittiratt said.

BP: For a while Kittirat, constantly referred to public debt not exceeding 60% of GDP, but as far as BP can tell in early January 2013, Yingluck stated debt should not exceed 50% of GDP. NNT from January 27, 2013:

The Prime Minister has assured that the Pheu Thai-led government will strictly adhere to financial disciplines in outlining the borrowing plan for the country’s basic infrastructure projects.

Speaking on “The Yingluck Government Meets the People” weekly TV program, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra reiterated the government’s plan to implement a set of national strategic policies for the 2014 fiscal year to move Thailand forward.

…

PM Yingluck affirmed that the government’s borrowing plan for more than 2.2 trillion baht would adhere to strict fiscal disciplines while affirming to keep the level of public debt below 50% of GDP.

Yingluck at the FCCT essentially repeating this:

Thailand’s strong fiscal position allows us to finance these projects through various sources, including government borrowings, and some projects we will encourage private sector participation.

(Impact on GDP and Jobs) Throughout the investment period over the next 7 years, it is expected that investments will not only increase the level of GDP on average by around 1 percent each year but also create around 500,000 jobs.

(Public Debt / GDP no more than 50%) More importantly, Public Debt to GDP is expected to rise but once the returns from investments are realized public to GDP will begin to fall. We expect that throughout investment period it will not increase to more than 50 percent.

Asia News from March 2013 showing that Kittirat is starting to fall in line in regards to using the 50% level:

Mr Kittiratt rebutted claims that heavy borrowing to fund the megaprojects would sharply increase public debt, saying the borrowing would be phased so that debt remained below 50% of gross domestic product.

Public debt is currently around 45% of GDP and policymakers for years have set a ceiling of 60%. Debt levels in some of the troubled countries in Europe are well above 100% of GDP.

A debt ratio of 50% of GDP is not high and the government would be able to repay the money within a few decades, said Mr Kittiratt.

NNT from April 2013:

Secretary General to the Prime Minister, Suranand Vejjajiva, has ensured the transparency of the government’s 2.2 trillion baht infrastructure overhauling projects, while pointing out that the government will be able to keep public debt ceiling lower than 50% of the GDP.

BP: While the 2.2 trillion infrastructure project is a lot of money, only around 30-40 billion baht will be spent this year. It will be spent over several years, and possibly much longer.

The previous post looked at forecasts for public debt with the government having it remain just below 50% over the next five years whereas others think it may hit 80% by 2019.  Forecasts are relevant to political perception, but the greater issue is the actual public debt. The level of public debt is likely to be something that the government will very closely monitor over the next seven years and will have to adjust spending accordingly to avoid serious political problems. You have to remember despite the complaints over the spending of Thaksin, public debt as % of GDP declined significantly under Thaksin between 2001-2006 (from 58% at the end of 2000 to 41.2% in September 2006).  Things will likely be different for Yingluck as it is difficult to see public debt falling below 44%. In contrast, Thaksin attacked the Democrats prior to the 2000 election over the debt they have incurred post-1997 albeit the attack was more aimed at foreign debt, but the shoe will be on the other foot now.

The higher the level of debt the more attention to government spending. The government has been freely spending/forgoing income on various ongoing stimulative projects such as rice pledging scheme and continuing the diesel tax waiver. Both will likely have to be curtailed once infrastructure spending starts to seriously increase (within the next two years?).

Below are four scenarios:

1. Below 50%: By the next election (which will be held by July 2015), the government will not want debt to exceed 50% of GDP. Why 50% you ask? Simple, it is a round number. It is a threshold at which point you are likely to see more news stories and more concern about public debt. Yes, 50.1% is not that different from 49.9%, but psychologically it will seem less. The government seems to have recognized this as you can see by statements by members of the government this year.

Simply put, BP doesn’t see that public debt will be a big issue if public debt as  remains below 50%. The government will still be able to borrow money quite easily and the interest rate won’t be that high. Yes, there will likely be articles saying debts are becoming too high, but they will be mainly preaching to the converted. We will still be below a level of debt that even the Democrats previously argued was manageable (for example, Korn argued in 2007 that the government should spend to push debt up to 55-60% by 2012, but this didn’t happen).

Not to look too far in the future, but for the election after the next election, which would be held no later than July 2019, the government would like public debt to be below 50% although BP doesn’t think it is as crucial by then.

2. 50-54.9%: Obviously, it does depend on how much higher than 50%, but as noted above, the 50% threshold is when BP believes the Yingluck government will start to face problems. At this point, you will start to get increasing criticism. Obviously, if for one month it hits 50% and then falls and remains under 50% it will be less of an issue, but once the threshold has been breached it will have already become a public issue even if public debt went below the 50% threshold later. The government may actually delay some infrastructure spending to ensure the 50% threshold is not breached before the next/2015 election.

After the 2015 election, breaching the 50% threshold becomes less of a political problem if the government can keep debt below 55% by the 2019 election and debt has stabilized and is trending downwards.

3. 55-59.9%: If public debt as % of GDP was to hit 55% before the 2015 election, it would seriously hurt the government. 55% is not a magic threshold like 50%, but if we went from 44.05% public debt in February 2013 to above 55% in just over two years then people will start to question a wide range of government programs including the infrastructure spending. It is hard to estimate how many voters would switch away from the government and there is of course the government’s actions regarding other policies and the opposition’s performance as well, but such a dramatic rise in debt would very likely result in the government in not winning a majority (this doesn’t mean they wouldn’t be able to form a government though).

For the 2019 election, the government could survive if public debt exceeds 55% (say up to 57%, but debt would need to be trending down). The closer that public debt is to 60%, the bigger the impact will be on the government.

4. Above 60%: We don’t even need to think about the worse case scenario of 80%. Sixty percent is when the government will start to face legal problems under the Public Debt Management Office Act of 2005 – see here for some basics. Can’t see the government surviving beyond the current term if the 60% threshold is breached before the 2015 election. The government could change the regulations,** but having to do so will focus even greater attention on the debt. Yes, even at 60%, public debt would be significantly lower than many western countries, but for Thailand and particularly for this government, a different level of high debt will apply.

NOTE: There are a few caveats to the above. The above assumes a generally weak but slowly improving world economy. If there is some natural disaster or another severe financial crisis in Europe or the US then it does change the above somewhat although any need for stimulus spending would have to mean that the government will almost certainly have to delay infrastructure spending. The government would get some leeway as long as it can keep debt below 60%.

NOTE: It is hard to calculate, but public opinion on the various infrastructure projects will matter as well. BP is assuming “somewhat satisfied” will be the outcome, but obviously if any of the projects turns out to be like Hopewell (or the transport infrastructure projects in Spain – see here and here) then well this changes things….

* Actually, started doing thinking about doing this series of posts a few months ago, but it was not until April 27 and 28 that really started to write the posts. Was not really expecting there to be much news last week so was caught out. Will try to post something soon about Yingluck’s speech and the lawsuit (as well as Anudith’s comments) as soon as time permits…

** Reading the Act, BP can’t find reference to the 60% figure so it seems to have have been a regulation issued (which corresponds with this article which refers to “… 60% target set by the Finance Ministry itself”). Now, the regulation could be changed to 65%, but the basic point is that any change will also attract attention.

There has been a lot of concern raised in the media about public debt in Thailand. This is not new – see here – but with the government’s planned 2 trillion baht infrastructure plan, which is planned to be spent over seven years, together with other government spending, we have seen increased concern about the level of public debt.

Below is a chart, adopted from the Public Debt Management Office, showing Thai government gross public debt as % of GDP over the last few years:

Source: PDMO, as of April 27, 2013 (the figures seems to slightly change – assume as there are slight recalculations to GDP figures).

From a Credit Suisse First Boston report from April 2013 (PDF) which has created a chart showing the Thai government forecasts of infrastructure spending per year of the high speed railway, the fiscal deficit, and public debt:

BP: Based on the government’s view, public debt will stay below 50% and start falling in a few years. However, others hold a different view. Somchai Jitsuchon, Research Director of the TDRI, from February 2013 in a piece entitled “Is Thailand heading for a public debt crisis?”:

Shown in the table of the cost structure of the government’s special projects over the next five years, it is predicted that if the economy grows by less than 6% per year the level of public debt is likely to reach and even surpass a shaky proportion of 60% of the country’s national income (GDP) _ a level assumed to be safe by many.

For an average citizen with commonsense, this should sound worrisome.

It should also worry the government. If we look at this debt trend from a “risk management” basis, it certainly is worrisome. In risk management, one would evaluate both positive and negative outcomes that might occur, and do whatever is necessary to prepare for the worst.

So even if the economy grows by at least 6% annually over the next 10-15 years, the country’s public debt-to-GDP ratio would begin to fall and stabilise (though this is certainly a big “if”), it is by no means a sure thing.

And what about the worst-case scenario?

The worst is when the economy grows by 4% or less per year while the government continues to spend according to its current plan without generating more future income to cover its enormous expenses. In that case, debt-to-GDP ratio would approach 80% quickly, and the country would surely lose its credit trustworthiness.

The Nation has Pridiyathorn something similar:

Mr. Pridiyathorn Devakula, former deputy prime minister and finance minister, said he was concerned the country’s public debt will surpass 60 per cent of GDP and may reach as high as 80 per cent by 2019. 

A few months before Somchai of TDRI wrote his op-ed, TDRI’s Nipon Poapongsakorn was less pessimistic in his forecast on the level of public debt to GDP:

This is similar to the IMF’s predictions

Source: IMF

BP: Having said that, and while can’t find estimates beyond 2013, the World Bank in their December 2012 report is more pessimistic than the IMF suggesting debt will be close to 50% this year:

Public debt is estimated to be close to 50 percent of GDP in 2013. Much of the Government’s borrowing planned for FY2013 will be used to finance the off-budget water resource management projects under the Emergency Decree on Water Resource Management and the Government’s major policy programs. The former could amount up to Bt330 billion or around 2.8 percent of GDP.

Borrowing will also be used to finance the Government’s major policy programs. These programs are estimated to cost around 2.4 percent of GDP in 2013, while costing 5.5 percent in 2012. Given these, public debt is estimated to be close to 50 percent of GDP by end-2013 from around 45 percent in end- 2012. While this rise in debt level needs to be managed prudently, it is not excessive. Moreover, the structure of Thailand’s public debt is such that over 90 percent of the debt is domestic debt and long-term. However, because many of the programs, such as the paddy pledging scheme, are also financed through the government’s specialized financial institutions (SFIs), these could weaken their balanced sheets in the future and are contingent liabilities to the Government

BP: Although, as you can see the World Bank views this rise is not excessive.

The Economist‘s global debt clock puts the debt at 48.9% in 2013 and 51.9% in 2014.

BP: Aside from differing views on the amount of government spending from non-infrastructure spending on various programs and GDP growth, there is another reason for less pessimistic views on the level of public debt in the future and that is some are skeptical the government can actually spend the money. Andrew Stotz from April 2013: 

Implementation will likely fall short. But whether the Gov’t will actually be able to implement these Bt2tn infrastructure investments should be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism, since history has shown that Thai governments often take a long time to complete their plans. Even if the Gov’t follows through, we do not believe that the impact will be as big as many may think, since it is likely that the spending will be spread over a longer time period than is planned for.

BP: A report from CSFB from April 2013 agrees pointing out that the high speed trains and the larger projects under the water management program probably face the highest risk of delay for a variety of reasons including administrative bottlenecks and risks of protest from local communities and NGOs.

Finally, from Kasikorn Research from 2002 with the headline “PUBLIC DEBT MAY EXCEED 65 PERCENT“:

The public debt has recently become an interesting issue in many quarters. The government has decided to cut its budget for the fiscal year 2003 to Bt999.9 billion, versus its estimated revenues for the same fiscal year of Bt825 billion, hence reducing the year’s budget deficit to Bt174.9 billion. The cut was as a result of the government’s decision to observe greater conservatism amidst concerns on the size of the public debt.

…

Given that that portion of the burden must be shouldered by the FIDF itself (thereby not increasing the burden on the government’s budget) under the government’s 2003 fiscal budget, the public debt for fiscal year 2003 should stand at 63.8 percent to the GDP — increasing from an estimated 60.3 percent of the fiscal year 2002 budget. That rise, which would be in line with the government’s 65 percent target, should be a factor reflecting that the 2003 fiscal budget can be managed to maintain fiscal discipline and the level of public debt, while also stimulating the economy.

As for the issue regarding whether or not the public debt is too high, TFRC views that the level of public debt has shown a dramatic increase since the financial crisis and might hit its highest level of 67.2 percent in the year 2005, from our perspective. This level is above the government’s 65 percent target.

BP: In the end, the forecast was way off as the below chart, from the Public Debt Management Office shows, that in 2005 that debt actually decreased to 50.62%:

BP: The purpose of this example is not to say don’t listen to forecasts or predictions. They need to be taken into account, but they are only forecasts/predictions. They are a lot of “if” this then that with the forecasts. The most important number to look at is the actual public debt numbers that come out on a month-by-month basis – there is a 1-2 month lag as it takes time for GDP figures to come out – and then to see which forecasts are proving accurate.

In the next post, BP will look at what public debt % thresholds that the government likely face political problems.

First, on exactly what constitutes public debt. The US Congressional Research Service have a fairly easy-to-understand summary (PDF) on sovereign/public debt:

Measuring Sovereign Debt
A nation’s debt burden is usually reported as a percentage of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP), which indicates the size of the country’s economy. Scaling debt to the size of the economy provides some indication of the government’s relative debt burden, since it is expected that countries with bigger economies can sustain higher levels of debt in absolute terms than smaller economies.

…

Public debt can also be reported on a gross basis, referring to the government’s total liabilities, or on a net basis, referring to the government’s total financial liabilities minus the government’s financial assets. For governments with large financial assets, this can make a big difference. Japan’s gross general government debt in 2012 is estimated to be 237% of GDP, but its net general government debt was almost half that (135% of GDP). In contrast, forecasted Greece gross general government debt equaled its forecasted net general government debt in 2012; both were 171% of GDP.

Finally, there is often interest in who holds the government’s debt: foreign or domestic investors. As discussed above, some advanced economies sell most of their bonds to their citizens while others sell to foreigners. Italy and Japan, for example, sell large portions of their bonds to domestic investors. To address this issue, “external” public debt, or government debt owed to foreign creditors, is sometimes distinguished from “domestic” public debt, or government debt owed to domestic creditors.

Many analysts warn that data on government debt should be used cautiously. They argue that governments do not account properly for all their financial obligations, and that if these hidden debts were included, estimates of government debts could be substantially higher.

Data on public debt levels are generally self-reported, and although there are international standards for data reporting, governments have some discretion about what is included on their balance sheet. For example, analysts caution that governments may not include their loan guarantees, obligations of state-owned enterprises, obligations of the central bank, or implicit guarantees in their data reports. Some governments may also underreport data. In the Greek debt crisis, for example, revelations of underreported budget deficits contributed to investor anxiety surrounding the sustainability of Greece’s debt. Some economists also argue that some governments do not fully account for spending on government programs for aging citizens, such as pensions and health care, in their budget projections, leading to substantial underestimates of future debt levels.

BP: In Thailand, for gross government debt which includes debts of majority government-owned state-enterprises, the level of debt is 44% of GDP. If we were looking at net debt and excluding the liabilities of majority government-owned state-enterprises then it would be around 21% of GDP.

On the relevance of the level of public debt, IMF’s Fiscal Monitor : Fiscal Adjustment in an Uncertain World from April 2013:

What should be the ultimate objective of fiscal adjustment? Stabilizing the public debt ratio has intui- tive appeal, as it means the government will be able to finance its operations and remain solvent over time.7 However, there are many reasons why merely stabiliz- ing public debt at high levels would not be optimal. A large body of research, summarized in previous issues of the Fiscal Monitor, concludes that high public debt leads to higher interest rates and slower growth (Table 8).8 Most studies find that high debt levels (above 80–90 percent of GDP) have a negative effect on growth (some 0.15–0.20 percent per 10 percent- age points of GDP).* High debt also makes public finances more vulnerable to future shocks, because it constrains governments’ ability to engage in counter- cyclical policies and because the larger the initial debt ratio, the bigger the increase in the primary surplus required to stabilize that ratio after an adverse shock to growth or interest rates. Indeed, when debt is high, there is a risk of falling into a bad equilibrium caused by self-fulfilling expectations (high debt is unsustain- able because markets believe it is so and set interest rates accordingly).

BP: As you know, Thailand’s public debt – regardless of whether you look at gross and net debt – is well below 80% although obviously you want some leeway for substantial additional spending if there is a financial crisis.

From the same IMF report:

SOURCE: IMF (2013+ figures are estimates)

NOTE: Haven’t included the net debt figures from the IMF as they don’t have the figures for Thailand – see World Bangkok net debt figures at the end of the ost

BP: So in comparison with other emerging markets, Thailand’s current gross public debt is higher than the average and debt is forecast to increase unlike the average of others. However,  when you compare the 2012 Thailand public debt data to more advanced economies, Thailand’s debt is significantly lower:

SOURCE: IMF

BP: In comparison with advanced economies though, Thailand’s public debt is not high.

Now, looking at a regional comparison, from a recent Credit Suisse First Boston report:

NOTE: From CSFB “we note that government debt levels are high in Singapore (107.6% of GDP in 2011), although we note that the debt is backed by assets”.

BP: Thailand is right in the middle…

Also, most Thai debt is domestic: 

BP: Relevance of this is that if there is an economic crisis and the Baht drops, repayments would be made in Baht unlike in 1997.

Finally, on a related issue, also from the IMF report, as cited above.

BP: The relevance of this is to see each year how much new debt the government will need to finance + also how much old debt will need to be refinanced. Obviously, the higher the figure the greater the potential problem that you will not be able to finance the debt and most offer more attractive interest rates to do so.

Bloomberg on April 30:

Thailand’s bonds rose and onshore interest-rate swaps dropped to a two-year low on speculation the central bank will cut borrowing costs amid pressure from the government to curb inflows.

…

The yield on the 3.625 percent debt maturing May 2015 fell one basis point, or 0.01 percentage point, to 2.78 percent as of 9:24 a.m. in Bangkok, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. That was the lowest level since November 2010. It dropped seven basis points in April, a third monthly decline.

The one-year swap contract, the fixed cost needed to receive a floating rate, slipped two basis points to 2.45 percent today and fell 20 basis points in April. That was the biggest monthly decrease since October, when the central bank last lowered borrowing costs by a quarter of a percentage point to 2.75 percent.

Bloomberg:

The cost of protecting notes sold by Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines against default averages 98 basis points, CMA data show, compared with 270 for Italy and Spain.

…

The cost of insuring Thailand’s sovereign debt using five- year credit-default swaps is 187 basis points lower than Italy’s, yet S&P rates both nations BBB+, the third-lowest investment grade. The contract for Malaysia, which is assessed five levels below Aa1-rated France by Moody’s, is at a one basis point discount to the European nation.

BP: The relevance of this is the cost of servicing the debt in Thailand is quite low now because the overall economic situation including the amount of current public debt is viewed as being stable even when compared to some advanced economies like Spain and Italy.

Above, BP has looked at gross debt, below is data from the World Bank for a number of countries, and it is net debt as % of GDP:

NOTE: Explanation from the World Bank is, “Debt is the entire stock of direct government fixed-term contractual obligations to others outstanding on a particular date. It includes domestic and foreign liabilities such as currency and money deposits, securities other than shares, and loans. It is the gross amount of government liabilities reduced by the amount of equity and financial derivatives held by the government. Because debt is a stock rather than a flow, it is measured as of a given date, usually the last day of the fiscal year”.

NOTE: Choice of countries is one made by BP and includes those where we have full data – or as “full” as possible as also wanted to include Russia and Brazil –  and then removed a few countries so was able to actually do capture the screenshot page.

BP: From a net debt perspective, Thailand’s debt is very low in comparison with other countries. This partly explains why it is relatively easy for Thailand to borrow money at such low rates.

Overall, gross government public debt shows Thailand is above average compared to other emerging economies with forecast debt continued to slowly rise over the next five years, but its level of debt to GDP is quite low compared to advanced economices and average compared to other Southeast Asian economies. When looking at net debt, Thailand’s public debt is very low.

NOTE: The next post will look at predictions/forecasts for Thai government debt and subsequent post will look at politics/perception of debt in Thailand.

* The most prominent study, Reinhart and Rogoff study, finding that high debt levels have a negative effect on growth has been strongly critiqued for the study’s inaccurate data (R&R’s defense which acknowledges some data errors although they say it doesn’t change their argument). This article tries to referee the debate.

BBC:

Fraudster James McCormick has been jailed for 10 years for selling fake bomb detectors.
…
He is thought to have made £50m from sales of more than 7,000 of the fake devices to countries, including Iraq.
The fraud “promoted a false sense of security” and contributed to death and injury, the judge said. He also described the profit as “outrageous”.

Police earlier said the ADE-651 devices, modelled on a novelty golf ball finder, are still in use at some checkpoints.

Sentencing McCormick, Judge Richard Hone said: “You are the driving force and sole director behind [the fraud].”

The Independent notes that, he must serve 5 years before he is eligible for parole, but  a further jail sentence is possible:

James McCormick is due to be freed under licence after five years of his sentence. However, he also faces another ten years in prison if he fails to disclose the whereabouts of the money – “obscene profits,” said Judge Richard Hone – from the sale of the devices which were based on novelty golf ball finders.

Channel 4 with a long quote from the judge:

Judge Hone QC went on: “The principal aggravating feature is that although it cannot be proved that the use of the device caused a specific death or loss of limb – and I accept that at Iraqi checkpoints other detection devices were used – yet what you perpetrated was a callous confidence trick.

“The jury found that you knew the devices did not work, yet the soldiers in Iraq and elsewhere believed in them, in part due to your powers of salesmanship and in part the extravagant and fraudulent claims made in your promotional material.”

The Register:

Detective Superintendent Nigel Rock from the Avon and Somerset police told BBC Radio 4′s PM that the police quickly found scientists who attested that the devices didn’t work, and McCormick declined to be interviewed until charged. But the investigation was hampered by difficulties in getting information from overseas.

“I think, deliberately, McCormick targeted troubled countries, countries that were trying to recover from conflict, and perhaps hadn’t got an established law enforcement and government structure and I think he exploited that,” Rock said.

“He developed a sales technique, and perhaps as importantly a demonstration technique, that unfortunately convinced some people in senior positions that the device worked,” he said. “In the culture of some of these countries if a senior operator says this device works then clearly some of the staff believe that because their boss has told them.”

BP: So why would he target Thailand then….

As noted previously, we have an Iraqi General who has been arrested, but in Thailand we are talking about going after low-level officials. The Nation:

The agency is likely to press charges against Jackson Electronics (Thailand) Co Ltd and ASLM Trading Co Ltd, two trading companies that represented McCormick’s company.

…

The DSI also found that some officials from the 13 state agencies could be held accountable for procurement of the devices.

The National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) last July accepted the GT200 case filed by the DSI and appointed a panel to probe the irregularities.

Officials from some agencies such as the Central Institute of Forensic Science (CIFS) have been summoned by the NACC to acknowledge charges related to procurement of overpriced equipment. The NACC and DSI may press charges against Level 8-9 officials at other agencies for alleged abuse of authority, for not complying with regulations in state bidding procedures.

BP: So will any lessons be learnt?

*Argh, there are a couple of errors here and have completely re-written the first paragraph and headline which incorrectly stated that the GT200 seller had been convicted.

Below is a chart, adopted from the Public Debt Management Office, showing Thai government public debt as % of GDP:

Source: PDMO, as of April 27, 2013 (the figures seem to slightly change – assume as there are slight recalculations to GDP figures).

NOTE: You can see a larger image with each month’s figures plotted – see here.

NOTE: This is gross public debt. If you were to look at net public debt, you would reduce the 44% figure to 36% as the government as has the cash equivalent of 8% of GDP deposited at private banks and the Bank of Thailand.

BP: Total debt is just over 5 trillion baht (US$170.3 billion), but just over 1 trillion baht of this is state enterprise debt. The level of public debt could be reduced by selling some shares in some state enterprises. This was a political issue at the beginning of last year. The Bangkok Post from January 2012:

Selling 2% of PTT to reduce govt ownership from 51% to 49% to erase govt debt so govt can borrow more to finance flood-prevention infrastructure.

The government is considering whether to reduce its stake in PTT Plc and Thai Airways International Plc (THAI) in order to cut public debt.

Virabongsa Ramangkura, chairman of the Strategic Committee for Reconstruction and Future Development, said the government may sell a 2% stake in PTT, the biggest listed company on the Stock Exchange of Thailand, to the state-controlled Vayupak Fund. The government currently controls 51% of PTT, with the Vayupak Fund holding 15%.

The energy giant reported total consolidated liabilities of 756 billion baht as of the end of September 2011, with company liabilities of 459 billion.

“Reducing government ownership to 49% means PTT would no longer be a state enterprise and the company’s debt would not be considered public debt,” Dr Virabongsa said at yesterday’s CEO Forum at the BoI Fair

BP: So you could wipe out most of the state enterprise debt with this. This proposal was harshly criticized at the time even if some of the criticism was conspiratorial in nature. At the time, just-removed Finance Minister Thirachai also criticized the plan. The Nation:

On his Facebook page, Thirachai today reacted to the proposed selling of a 2 per cent stake in PTT to Vayupak Fund, to reduce the Finance Ministry’s stake to 49 per cent.

…

“In reality, will this reduce the government’s control? Is this a self-deceiving ploy or a ploy to deceive others? To accountants, this is window dressing – when the shop windows are decorated regardless of the mess inside,” he said.

He foresaw no change in government control following the transaction. Under an international accounting practice, as Vayupak is a pseudo government fund, PTT would remain a state enterprise and the government’s obligations to its debts remain.

He noted that Greece committed window dressing, to have the public debts hidden. Once the fact was revealed, the country has lost its creditability.

BP: This criticism seems odd since rating agencies, such as Fitch and Moody’s, exclude state-enterprise debts as part of Thailand’s public debt (hence why you see a 30% figure quoted). Their ratings would be unaffected, but Thirachai does have a point that selling a 2% share is window dressing. Nevertheless, isn’t this because of the perverse calculation of including the liabilities of a 51%+ government-owned state-enterprise debt as part of public debt?

NOTE: For now, the government hasn’t followed through with the sale of the 2% share.

In some countries, such as Vietnam and Korea, state-owned enterprise debt is not included as part of public debt. In the US some debts, such as for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as well as for guarantees for financial institutions, are not included. It is somewhat arbitrary. Obviously, you don’t want governments hiding liabilities in loss-ridden state enterprises but this is not the case for PTT. It is not as those selling the 2% stake would affect PTT’s rating. Very little would actually change.

As BP understands it, and as we are only looking at gross debt we are only* including liabilities and not assets, because the Thai government owns 51% of PTT 100% of the liabilities are included in the government’s public debt. So despite PTT doing very well - its profits continue to increase each year –  BP does wonder, would the government ever be tempted to intervene to stop PTT incurring more liabilities in order that public debt is not increased even if incurring the debt made financial sense? In many western countries such state enterprises have been privatised and hence the government gains money from the sale, but can also get the liabilities of the entity off the books although it does lose revenue as it won’t get its share of yearly profits (the latter doesn’t impact on public debt though). Therefore, you can see from the point of public debt, privatisation makes a lot of sense for governements.

Aside from completely excluding state-enterprise debt as Fitch and Moody’s do for Thailand, perhaps a better way is if the government owns 51% of the entity then when calculating the liabilities you only assign 51% of the liabilities to the government for gross public debt purposes. This reduces the incentive to sell a 2% share (or to completely privatise it and sell all the shares) to simply reduce public debt.

*Previous sentence incorrectly added an extra “not” “As BP understands it, and as we are only looking at gross debt we are not including liabilities and not assets”

Nevertheless, as The Economist, citing an academic research report, stated:

The system, imperfect as it is, drove the number of Thais with no health insurance down from 16.5m in 2001 to 2.9m in 2005  [subscription required] — just 4% of the population.

Then last year, in The Nation, Mushtaque Chowdhury and Natalie Phaholyothin of the Rockefeller Foundation’s Asia Regional Office in Bangkok stated that those with insurance has increased to 99% (i.e those with no health insurance down to 1%):*

In 2002 when Thailand was still a lower-middle income country with a GDP/capita of $1,900, the country achieved UHC. This did not happen overnight but gradually since the 1970s through the creation of three health insurance schemes: the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS), Social Security Scheme (SSS) and subsequently the Universal Coverage (UC) Scheme – formerly referred to as the “Bt30″ Scheme. Achieving a coverage rate of 99 per cent of the population is more than just meeting a national objective; it represents a source of inspiration to other low- and middle-income countries. As a matter of fact, officials from various health ministries and NGOs from Asia and Africa often request a visit to Thailand’s public health institutions such as the National Health Security Office, International Health and Policy Programme, Health Systems Research Institute and the Ministry of Public Health to “study how Thailand did it”.

As of now, 99 per cent of the Thai population is covered through a comprehensive healthcare package that ranges from health prevention and primary care, to hospitalisation due to traffic accidents to renal replacement therapy and access to ART treatment for HIV.

It has been shown that the UC Scheme has contributed significantly to reducing instances of catastrophic healthcare expenditures, especially in impoverished areas of the country. Based on the recent evaluation of the ten years of the Scheme, the number of impoverished households dropped from 3.4 per cent in 1996 to 0.8-1.3 per cent between 2006 and 2009, thus contributing to poverty reduction, building greater financial stability to vulnerable households and improved long-term livelihood security. In addition, it helps Thailand to attain the principle of the right to health for all. In a country with high income inequality as measured by the Gini Coefficient, access to affordable healthcare is a bridge that helps mitigate many of the socio-economic inequities that still plague this nation.

BP: However, and aside from the above The Nation op-ed since BP’s post over one year ago, there have been a number of papers/journal articles about the universal healthcare scheme. Below are three freely accessible ones.

A: “Demand and Reimbursement Effects of Healthcare Reform: Health Care Utilization and Infant Mortality in Thailand”,
Jonathan Gruber, Nathaniel Hendren, and Robert Townsend, NBER Working Paper No. 17739, January 2012. From the abstract:

The Thai 30 Baht program was one of the largest health system reforms ever undertaken by a low-middle income country. In addition to lowering the cost of care for the previously uninsured in public facilities, it also entailed a fourfold increase in funding provided to hospitals to care for the poorest 30% of the population (who were already publicly insured). For the previously uninsured, we find that the 30 Baht program led to increased health care utilization, as well as a shift from private to public sources of care. But, we find a larger increase for the poor who were previously publicly insured, especially amongst infants and women of childbearing age. Using vital statistics records, we find that the increased access to healthcare by the publicly insured poor led to a reduction in their infant mortality of at least 6.5 per 1,000 births. This suggests significant improvements in infant mortality rates can be achieved through increased access to healthcare services for the poor and marginalized groups.

…[from the paper]

Using vital statistics records from the Thailand Ministry of Public Health, we first document a robust positive correlation between the fraction of a province enrolled in the MWS program and the provincial infant mortality rate in each of the 4 years prior to 2001 for which we were able to obtain data. In other words, prior to 30 Baht the negative relationship between income and infant mortality holds across provinces within Thailand. However, after the 30 Baht program, this correlation evaporates and is statistically indistinguishable from zero in years 2002-2008 (both in each year and jointly). We estimate that the 30 Baht program, which provided a funding increase of less than $25 per capita, led to a reduction in infant mortality amongst the poor in Thailand of at least 6.5 per 1,000 births. Since the MWS [precursor to universal coverage for the poor] group is roughly 30% of the population, this implies an aggregate reduction in Thailand’s infant mortality rate of at least 2 per 1,000 births.

BP: So reduced mortality of at least 2 per 1,000 births for the entire population OR 6.5 births per 1,000 births for the poor (who were covered under a previous system).

B. “Universal Health Care and Informal Labor Markets The Case of Thailand”, Adam Wagstaff and Wanwiphang Manachotphong, Policy Research Working Paper 6116 (World Bank, July 2012):

Our results point to labor market effects: UC [universal coverage] appears to have encouraged employment especially among married women, to have reduced formal-sector employment at least among married men, and to have increased informal-sector employment especially among married women. We see the largest positive informal-sector employment effects in the agricultural sector. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that by eliminating the medical expenditure risks associated with informal-sector employment, UC has allowed couples to switch from a situation where the breadwinner works in an urban formal-sector job and the spouse co-locates but does not work to having both working in informal-sector jobs in a rural setting.

…

Our effects suggest that UC increased informal-sector employment by two percentage points initially rising to just under 10 percentage points after three years.

…

Thailand’s UC scheme – like Mexico’s Seguro Popular scheme – does appear to have encouraged growth in informal-sector employment, although the negative effects on the formal sector in Thailand appear to have been very small.

BP: The paper does wonder about the merits of this, but it does provide more choice for families.

C: “Why has the Universal Coverage Scheme in Thailand achieved a pro-poor public subsidy for health care?” in BMC Public Health 2012, 12 (Suppl 1):S6. Key excerpt:

The total government subsidy, net of direct household payment, for combined outpatient (OP) and inpatient (IP) services to public hospitals and health facilities provided to UCS members, had increased from 30 billion Baht (US$ 1 billion) in 2003 to 40-46 billion Baht in 2004-2009. In 2003 for 23% and 12% of the UCS members who belonged to the poorest and richest quintiles of the whole-country populations respectively, the share of public subsidies for OP service was 28% and 7% for the poorest and the richest quintiles, whereby for IP services the share was 27% and 6% for the poorest and richest quintiles respectively. This reflects a pro-poor outcome of public subsidies to healthcare. The OP and IP public subsidies remained consistently pro-poor in subsequent years.

The pro-poor benefit incidence is determined by higher utilization by the poorest than the richest quintiles, especially at health centres and district hospitals. Thus the probability and the amount of household direct health payment for public facilities by the poorest UCS members were less than their richest counterparts.

BP: The scheme currently costs around 120 billion baht (US$4.1 billion) a year, as of 2011 and according to the World Bank. Despite it being a relatively successful scheme, universally praised, and providing positive health outcomes particularly for the poor there seems little discussion of it. As blogged previously, when voters were interviewed a couple of years ago there are two policies which stood out, namely the universal healthcare scheme (i.e. 30 baht scheme) and the village fund – this matches with BP’s own observations. Such policies are not just pandering to the “unprincipled wants and needs of the attention-deficient, politically apathetic masses” and they didn’t bankrupt Thailand. Many other policies were hit-and-miss, but there is good data for the universal coverage healthcare policy to show that it worked. Hence, this partly explains Thaksin’s continued popularity today and the problem for a non-Thaksin party to win an election given the large number of people who benefitted from the policy.

* Clarified this sentence.

Source: The Telegraph (click on the link for the full size cartoon).

BP: The Daily Mail has one too…. We now have more talk of progress into the investigation, but still just talk. Then you have Army C-in-C Prayuth as per NNT:

Thailand’s army chief general Prayuth Chan-ocha has asked the public to stop making comments or criticisms about the controversial bomb detector GT200 procurement.

…

Commander-in-Chief Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha has requested the public to stop fueling criticisms and leave the case to be investigated by Department of Special Investigation (DSI) and the Thai court. He added that the army has already stopped using the devices for 2-3 years. However, he admitted that some military personnel still use them since there is no other alternative instrument.

BP: If some military personnel are still using them then well the army is actually still using them despite what Prayuth states. One hopes people are least no longer detained on the basis of the “positive” test of the GT200 device…..

The Guardian reports on the seller’s conviction in the UK:

A businessman has been found guilty of a multimillion-pound fraud involving the sale of fake bomb detectors to Iraq and around the world.

A jury at the Old Bailey found Jim McCormick, 57, from near Taunton, Somerset, guilty on three counts of fraud over a scam that included the sale of £55m of devices based on a novelty golfball finder to Iraq. They were installed at checkpoints in Baghdad through which car bombs and suicide bombers passed, killing hundreds of civilians. Last month they remained in use at checkpoints across the Iraqi capital.

McCormick, who faces up to eight years in jail when he is sentenced next month, also sold the detectors to Niger, Syria, Mexico and other countries including Lebanon where a United Nations agency was a client.

…

General Jihad al-Jabiri, who ran the Baghdad bomb squad, is in jail on corruption charges relating to the contracts. Some Iraqis still believe the detectors work while others are angry they have cost lives.

“We know that a few of them are defective,” an official at the ministry of the interior told the Guardian last month. “The other problem is how they are used. It requires the operator to be in the right frame of mind.”

BP: Interesting to see a conviction on the Iraqi side.* On one hand, the chances of a conviction of the Thai distributor or even of the purchasers in Thailand seem slim given both Army Commander-in-Chief Prayuth and forensic expert Pornthip (both of whose agencies have purchased GT200 or similar devices) have defended their use and a thorough investigation would air the military’s dirty laundry in public,** but on the other hand, there is some investigation of the purchase being conducted. Such investigations can make progress if the “circumstances are right”.*** Will this be the case here?

* Insert your own joke on where Thailand is compared to Iraq….

** i.e how can it be fraud if the user says the goods work would be an argument that the lawyers would argue.

*** Right circumstances is more than evidence of crime, it depends on who was carrying out the crime….

NOTE: Argh, there are a couple of errors in this post and have completely re-written the first paragraph and headline which incorrectly stated that the GT200 seller had been convicted.

h/to a reader

In Malaysia, meanwhile, facilitating peace for Thailand’s Malay Muslims would “bode well” for the incumbent prime minister Najib Razak, he [Thitinan] notes.

“Malaysia’s domestic politics must not end up tripping up or undermining the peace process,” warns Mr Thitinan. “Mr Najib’s electoral interests aside, the Thai government should also be talking to opposition parties in Malaysia, since the incumbent is electorally challenged at the coming polls. In addition, “Indonesia’s role as third-party facilitator down the road should not be overlooked”.

..

Most experts agree that any talks are better than none. But the current effort is more symbolic than anything else, notes Mr McCargo.

“The two key features of these negotiations are the personal interest in the process taken by Prime Minister Yingluck – who has largely avoided confronting the southern issue since taking office in 2011 – and Thai government recognition that Malaysian participation will be central to addressing the problem, he says.

“That said, it remains unclear that the militant ‘leaders’ taking part have any real control over insurgents on the ground; nor is it clear how far Thailand’s politically powerful military are on board with the process. Given these caveats, the much-vaunted peace process looks distinctly tokenistic.”

BP: On the issue of whether the BRN represents the insurgents, Don Pathan in The Nation:

The two sides entered into a historic “agreement” on February 28 in Kuala Lumpur. Representing the separatist side was Hasan Toib, an exiled figure who called himself a “liaison” officer for the BRN-C.

…

For others, the agreement is a big leap of faith because Hasan Toib doesn’t have much clout within the separatist community, much less command and control over militants on the ground, who have not ceased their campaign of violence in the deep South.

Hasan doesn’t have much to offer except a promise that he will talk to others, such as the BRN-C’s inner circle known as the Dewan Penilian Party (DPP), and ask them to come to the table. So far, the DPP is still giving Hasan and the Thai side the cold shoulder.

As a “liaison” officer, Hasan is stuck in limbo. BRN-C leaders do not take him seriously, but instead toy with him by asking him to raise certain sensitive issues knowing that the Thais do not have the stomach to accommodate them. These issues include the granting of diplomatic immunity to the negotiators and the rest of the BRN-C political wings, so that they can’t be charged with crimes. A well-placed source in the Malaysian government, which is faciliatating the talks, confirmed such demands.

BP: While Don is dismissive of Hassan, the International Crisis Group in a report last December i.e. before the talks “breakthrough”, described him as a “a senior separatist figure associated with one of the PULO factions” so while he is not the head of any group, he is not so minor. Also, while Don describes the leaders as toying with Thai authorities for immunity, Michael Vatikiotis has noted previously in an op-ed in the Bangkok Post that there is a real risk for insurgent leaders in coming out in the open:

The Patani Malay Liberation Movement is much misunderstood. Its leadership is shadowy because of a long history of treachery and betrayal at the hands of Thai or Malaysian intelligence. The last time the movement engaged openly in negotiations with the Thai military, under Malaysian protection, in the late 1990s, two of its key leaders were arrested and deported to Thailand where they remain in prison.

Since then, the movement has insisted on sending intermediaries and representatives to engage the Thai government. Although this means their mandate is somewhat restricted, they argue that Thai officials are similarly hamstrung by factional infighting within the Thai state system, and no clear signal from the very highest levels of the Thai establishment that it means business.

BP: Hence Hassan. There is a separate question on how serious the actual leaders are, but just because they are not at the table now, it doesn’t mean there is not some progress by the talks taking place although I would agree with McCargo that for now they are more symbolic and we are at the “baby steps” stage of the talks and a very, very long way off a possible agreement.

Also, think about the issue of amnesty. An amnesty is a controversial issue for red shirts and the military (over the crackdown) even though each of these groups have significant national level of support within Thai society.* There is no such level of support for the insurgents in the Deep South or even on the issue of the the Deep South. This is not even getting into the nature of the crimes committed by the insurgents i.e. monks beheaded, teachers killed etc. What chance of amnesty in near future for insurgents? Slim, but would increase if reds get amnesty. Finally, without an amnesty or immunity will the real insurgent leaders ever turn up?

*Is there really any dispute that the reds are a significant constituency? For the military, this is not to say they are the most popular entity, but just they have support from other other areas of the establishment and also some support from the Democrats over the crackdown.

NOTE: The current talks between the Thai government and the BRN are an issue that BP would like to cover in more detail, but simply lack time for a comprehensive post so will try to do smaller posts, like this one, in a few issues as time permits.

**Corrected a few sentences once BP was properly awake, but this didn’t change the meaning of the above.

The current premier, Yingluck Shinawatra, is the sister of the exiled Thaksin Shinawatra, and in 2011 she decided an easy way to cement her party’s grip on power was to win over farmers by paying above-market prices for their rice. “I earn more and have higher savings thanks to the program,” says Groon To-Chai, a 67-year-old farmer from Nakon Sawan province in central Thailand who says his monthly income has jumped by 50 percent, to 30,000 baht ($1,000). At $571 per metric ton, Thai rice is now much more expensive than Vietnamese and Indian rice.

…

Yingluck’s Cabinet last month approved plans to spend another 100 billion baht to buy rice from farmers. The government puts its overall losses at 80 billion baht, but Korn Chatikavanij, deputy leader of the opposition Democrat Party and former finance minister, says the loss for the first year alone was 200 billion baht. “It’s a disaster,” he says. “We shot ourselves in the foot.”

BP: Article also mentions problems over quality of rice that is stored for too long and fall in amount exported as well of the problem of India reentering the export market – which BP mentioned was a big problem in August 2012.

There are two issues on the cost. The government and the opposition are poles apart on the cost. TDRI puts the loss in the first year (October 2011-September 2012) at 112 billion baht (counting money spent, revenue received, and also taking into account storage costs and other costs associated with the scheme). The World Bank puts it at 115 billion Baht for the first year, but estimates that for future years it will be up to 140 billion baht.

By comparison, the income support scheme of the Democrats cost around 58 billion Baht over two years according to Korbsak (of the Democrats). According to the current, ie Puea Thai, Commerce Minister the income support scheme cost70-80 billion baht annually. According to Bloomberg, quoting the state-run Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives, the scheme cost 67 billion baht in the 2010-2011 production year although as noted by the farmer above he was receiving less money under the previous scheme.

Given the extra income for farmers, which is also helping to increase consumption in many rural areas, the government is unlikely to completely abandon the scheme despite the cost, but the rice pledging scheme is seeming to be like a snowball. At the beginning, the problem doesn’t look so big. An extra 45 billion billion for such increased income is something that the government would be prepared to take a hit on. However, unless there is a change in the international market, exports are likely to decline again, production to increase (and thus increased costs), and more rice stockpiles. If costs are 140 billion for October 2012-September 2013, what will they be for the following year? This also comes at the time where there is increased government spending in other areas. Unless there is a change in the international market, fiscally the scheme at its current price will be difficult to sustain beyond this year. Will the government bite the bullet and lower the amount from 15,000 Baht to 13,000 Baht?

A. Was the result surprising?

The election result is both surprising and not surprising. It is surprising because as the race went on, Pongsapat certainly had the momentum. As blogged just before the election:

BP: Agree with this, but would predict the following:

Pongsapat, 40-45%

Sukhumbhand, 36-40%

Other candidates, around 12-17%

No votes/spoilt votes, up to 5%

BP: If a multitude of factors goes Sukhumbhand’s way, he may eke out a victory, but any victory by Sukhumbhand would be by the narrowest of margins.

BP: The polls showed a 1-17% point gap. BP didn’t think the gap would be over 10 points let alone over 15 points and thought the margin would be just under 5 points. In addition, there seemed a slim chance that Sukhumbhand could just pull it off if Democrat voters turned out, but it is surprising just how wrong the polls were. As all the momentum was with Pongsapat, the failure of Puea Thai too win will be a disappointment to them. The Democrats would then only have the South as their main base and the loss would have intensified infighting within the Democrats. Abhisit may have even lost his position as party leader. At a minimum, the Democrats would have been in turmoil.

However, then again the result was not surprising. BP blogged in January before looking at any polls:

1. As noted the 2000 race is a bit of anomaly for the Democrats. In the three races since then, the Democrat Party candidate has received between 900,000 and 1,000,000 votes each time.

2. For the pro-Thaksin party candidate, no matter what is happening nationally (remembering that in 2001 and 2005 national elections, Thai Rak Thai won a clear majority of constituency seats in Bangkok), the pro-Thaksin party candidate received between 520,000-620,000 votes in the 4 elections. Even has support for Thai Rak Thai in Bangkok dropped, it doesn’t appear to have changed the level of support they have received in the gubernatorial election.

3. The independent vote has dropped over time and will probably drop again this time to less than 400,000 unless there is some dramatic change.

4. The closest race was in 2004, but even then the margin of victory for the Democrat Party over the pro-Thaksin candidate was over 292,000 votes. Based on history, it would be an upset if Puea Thai were to win the 2013 race. The Democrats have a natural advantage. It will be the margin of victory which will be the thing to watch. Puea Thai will be aiming to keep it within 100,000 votes whereas the Democrats will want it to exceed 200,000 votes.

5. BP would rate Sukhumbhand’s first term as average, but he is a relatively safe and solid candidate for the Democrats. He is a well-known commodity and rarely says something stupid. He is also not a hated figure amongst the red shirts/pro-Thaksin side – in fact, of all the Democrats he really put his neck on the line in 2010 to negotiate an outcome – see here and here. He won’t cause a surge in Puea Thai voters to go to the polls which is one thing that Puea Thai would need to win. Having said that, he won’t cause a surge of Democrat voters to go to the polls either. Some younger or disillusioned Democrat supporters will probably vote for Seripisut or the other independents, but they can do this safe in the knowledge that Sukhumbhand  - and not someone supported by Thaksin – will still win.

B. What others predicted : English language media

For the Bangkok Post and The Nation, BP covered them previously in this post. Mostly the Democrats were pessimistic on their chances although not so many stories from the final week so won’t repeat those posts here. AP:

“Right now people want Bangkok to be a more livable city and want to see policies that can offer a better mass transit system, public space and alternative transportation like bicycles,” said Prinya Thewanaruemitkul of Thammasat University in Bangkok. “But at the end of the day, national politics will be the deciding factor.”

C. What others predicted : Thai language media

Thai Rath‘s political analysis on February 21, entitled ถนัดกันไปคนละทาง, stated that what is sure is that the gimmick of talking about burning down of the city is not only not working for the Democrats, but is backfiring (ที่แน่ๆมุกเผาบ้านเผาเมืองนอกจากจุดไม่ติด ยังเสี่ยงกระแสดีดกลับ)

The Thai Rath‘s political analysis on February 24, entitled ศึกชิงเมืองหลวง ชี้ทิศทางประเทศ, stating the Democrat sources told them they saw the race as being close with only 50,000 votes in it (แพ้ชนะกันประมาณ 5 หมื่นเสียง) whereas those in Puea Thai though they would win by 100,000 votes (ซึ่งก็ใกล้เคียงกับพรรคเพื่อไทยที่เก็งว่า พล.ต.อ.พงศพัศจะแซงชนะแชมป์เก่าประมาณ 1 แสนคะแนน) with Thai Rath then stating that the race would be close and not the 200,000-300,000 vote margins of previous elections (สูสี ไม่แพ้ชนะกันขาด 2-3 แสนคะแนน เหมือนที่ผ่านมาแน่), but also noting that Abhisit wouldn’t be able to escape the feeling from those within the party who will pressure him to show responsibility if there is a loss (แพ้คง หนีไม่พ้นกระแสจากคนในพรรคไล่บี้ให้แสดงความรับผิดชอบ). The Democrats are in a position of not being able to lose (“แพ้ไม่ได้”) whereas for Puea Thai victory is a bonus (ในขณะที่พรรคเพื่อไทย ถ้าชนะถือว่าได้กำไร) although winning means they will be avoid the criticism that they are only a party for those from the provinces (เพื่อลบเสียง วิจารณ์เป็นแค่พรรคของคนต่างจังหวัด)

Thai Rath‘s analysis of February 27 entitled อภิสิทธิ์’ ก็เดิมพันด้วย was focusing on the future of Abhisit if the Democrats were to lose stating that the Democrats are talking about the same issues of reds burning down the city, the ghost of Thaksin (ประชาธิปัตย์ย้อนไปย้อนมาก็วนอยู่กับฉากเดิมๆ เสื้อแดงเผาเมือง ผีทักษิณ) and if they lose Abhisit won’t be able to escape the pressure (ถ้าแพ้ “อภิสิทธิ์” หนีไม่พ้นแรงกดดัน). Their analysis on February 28 noted that that if Abhisit lost that Surin Pitsuwan [until recently ASEAN Secretary-General and previously a Foreign Minister under the Democrats]

Then on March 2, Thai Rath’s political analysis, titled เหลี่ยมเก๋าแพ้กันขาด, security sources had stated that one candidate was leading in 30 districts and another in 20 districts (ตามข่าวที่หน่วยงานที่เกี่ยวข้องกับงานด้านความมั่นคงแห่งหนึ่งได้ทำการประเมินการเลือกตั้งผู้ว่าฯ กทม. พบว่า…และมีแนวโน้มได้รับการเลือกตั้ง ผู้สมัครคนหนึ่งมีคะแนนเสียงนำอยู่ 30 เขต ขณะที่อีกคนหนึ่งมีคะแนนนำอยู่ใน 20 เขต). This close to underground betting (ประเมินตัวเลขก็ใกล้เคียงกับราคาต่อรองโต๊ะพนันใต้ดิน). It may be a photofinish (อาจต้องตัดสินกันด้วยภาพถ่าย).

BP: Thai Rath changed their position over the final weeks to being less pessimistic about the Democrats chances – early on their were dismissive of the raising of the reds burning Bangkok and the Democrats going negative. At the end, they saw a close race, but were still devoting significant coverage about what would happen to Abhisit if the Democrats lost (i.e why so much attention about this unless a good possibility of the Democrats losing].

Matichon Weekly, March 1-7, p8
Over ten years, the Democrats have dominated local elections in Bangkok, winning gubernatorial races and local election results. However, for the national election in 2011, while Democrats won 23-10 seats, the gap on the party list vote was only 68,161 votes. There was a statement by Bhichai Rattanakul, former leader of the Democrats, that if Sukhumbhand lost that Abhisit should take responsibility and this meant resigning as leader. However, there have been no such calls by Puea Thai for Abhisit to resign if Sukhumbhand were to lose. Puea Thai were happy for Sukhumbhand to run as they saw him as weak. For Abhisit, he has political scars so his weakness may be a benefit for Puea Thai [i.e. Puea Thai don't want Abhisit to quit].

Matichon Weekly, March 1-7, p10
Pongsapat is still following the strategy of campaigning on policy whereas the Democrats have changed their campaign from one of selling their policies to stating that if you choose No. 9 you get the party who burnt down Bangkok. If you choose the independent candidates, you get No. 9. The race is one the Democrats cannot lose.

Matichon Weekly, March 1-7, p11
Pongsapat is leading in the polls. One of the likely reasons he is doing well is his positive campaigning. Democrats have been personally attacking him and also talking about the reds burning Bangkok – although Pongsapat has no connection with those events. Pongsapat has still, in the final part of the race, stated he will focus on positive campaigning. He also is campaigning on being able to seamlessly work with the central government as they come from the same party.

BP: Again, talk of what will happen to Abhisit, but Matichon Weekly were more upbeat on the chances of Puea Thai although noted that the Democrats had more to lose and hence they were pulling out all stops on campaining

Nation Weekend, March 1, p11
On turnout, previous results have shown that turnout has been much higher for national elections than local elections, but this time turn-out will likely be at least 60% because of greater competition and fresh new faces, such as Pongsapat. PT campaigned on ‘seamless’ operation between Bkk and Central government, but the Democrats have started to talk about “burning down of bangkok’. This election has a lot riding on it.

The analysis was that if Puea Thai won then there was no longer anything to fear especially in relation to amending the constitution, the amnesty bill or reconciliation bill or Thaksin coming home without punishment. Then you also have what a PT victory would mean for the Democrats. The fate of the Democrats rests in the hands of Bangkok. Others think a loss would enable reform in the Democrats. Realizing the problems they face, Democrat Deputy Party Leader Jurin stated that “If you don’t like Khun Chai [Sukhumbhand], please think of the party”.

Nation Weekend, March 1, p19
It seems like Senator Boonlert P. is the only one who thinks that Sukhumbhand will win as polls show that Pongsapat will win.  Having said that there can be no polls released in the final 7 days, it is the time when most votes will change. The writer wants think people to think about the political and economic factors. There is little chance of the independent candidates winning although Suharit is interesting as he uses social media for campaigning. Puea Thai is likely to get more support as the Democrats know that Sukhumbhand has nothing outstanding. However, we need to examine the political strategy of the Democrats who are using psychology. The Democrats are talking about burning the city, ‘if you don’t choose us, he [Thaksin] will come for sure’. The writer is unsure whether these tactics can change people’s minds, but want to raise the point that the Democrats have won using these tactics of people hating the other side. Puea Thai are now trying win over support from local communities – where the Democrats have a constant level of core support from local elections – but this is not easy. The writer doesn’t know who will win, but it seems Puea Thai have the advantage although they could finish second.

BP: Will mention in subsequent post, but do think Nation Weekend has a good summary on end part of the Democrat campaign. It was not just reds turning Bangkok, there was also a plea (begging ?) for people to vote for the Democrats and more importantly, a focus on the future of what would happen if Puea Thai won. Will look at commentary on why the Democrats won in a subsequent post.

NOTE: To learn more about why Sukhumbhand won, BP wanted to review what people were saying about what they thought would happen. This is partly for BP’s own benefit as have had limited time over the last 6 months so most of the above is something that only read after the result.

Chalerm. Pic: AP.

First, in the past, polls have shown that while he is one of the politicians that a plurality don’t want to see in Cabinet or his Cabinet performance is rated by a plurality to be rather low compared with his peers, he consistently is rated the top debater on the Puea Thai side (see here and here) and when asked to choose an individual to take over Puea Thai from Yingluck, he is No. 1 (albeit with a lower score, but still higher than others) and when those in the Northeast are asked which politician impressed them the most, he is second (Yingluck is 1st). If you are wondering, aren’t these contradictory? No, the first two polls, asked everyone to rate each Minister and Chalerm scores poorly. The second two polls – and also the two debate polls – asked people to choose a single Minister/person. This suggests Chalerm is disliked by more than those who like him, but there is a section of voters that like him more than others in Puea Thai and when asked to choose an individual, he does well.

Second, he was an early strong supporter of Yingluck and an opponent of the other choice for leader of Puea Thai in 2011, Mingkwan.

Third, as noted in “first”, Chalerm usually gets good scores for debating and when he doesn’t get his way, he sulks, for example, refusing to help out in the censure debate in 2011 when Mingkwan chosen to lead the party. Would Puea Thai risk upsetting again by removing him from the Cabinet? Seems unlikely.

Deputy Prime Minister Chalerm Yubamrung “postponed” his first trip ever to the deep South, saying he was needed in Bangkok to help the government push through its bill to borrow two trillion baht for infrastructure projects.

…

He said Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra ordered him to call off the trips and remain in Bangkok to attend parliament sessions, where he is considered a lead debater. …

Mr Chalerm said he has been assigned to clarify and answer legal issues arising from the government’s position.

Then once he did finally visit, Chalerm is quoted by the Bangkok Post as stating:

“The opposition has been nagging me for five months [for not visiting]. The Democrats have no idea how much of a burden is added to the authorities any time a deputy prime minister visits the region,” said Mr Chalerm, who spent the night in Pattani.

BP:

First, postponing the March trip for attending a parliamentary session on the infrastructure project, which is a major part of the government’s platform,* seems reasonable.

Second, it is also true that it is a big burden for the authorities to organize such trips given the precarious security situation –  trips to the region should not be excessive and there is a need to find the right balance in the number of trips – see this post looking at criticism of Thaksin for not visiting the Deep South enough. Also, particularly after there is a major visit there is usually a surge in violence.**

Third, the problem is not that Chalerm postponed the March trip, but why didn’t he go before this? More importantly, it just seems embarrassing that after the parliamentary session considering the infrastructure project, after Yingluck had told him to visit the Deep South, and after Yingluck made another trip to the Deep South to attend the funeral of the Yala deputy governor who was killed by insurgents, he finally visited. That is too many “afters” in BP’s view. Politically, it makes no sense that it took him so long to visit. His visit only happened after coming under increasing pressure to do so as outlined in this criticism of Chalerm by fellow MP, Chuwit (as translated by Veera of the Bangkok Post):

“I do not understand why Pol Cpt Chalerm Yubamrung has persistently refused to go to the three southernmost provinces and has put off a visit so many times with so many excuses.

“And now, again. When the deputy governor of Yala was killed by a road bomb, the prime minister again reminded Khun Chalerm to visit the region. Like every time before, Khun Chalerm pretended not to hear, took no heed and boasted on about other issues.

“I do not expect that a visit by Khun Chalerm would help resolve the problems but, at the least, Khun Chalerm should show some spirit and accept the fact that he was given the assignment to resolve the southern unrest problem.”

BP: Indeed.

Why did it take Chalerm so long to visit?

* Yingluck is criticised from the opposite point that she is not attending parliamentary sessions and should be cancelling trips instead, but then again the government probably won’t want to counter with this point as well it may be suggested Yingluck should follow her advice to Chalerm and attend parliament….

** After Yingluck’s recent trip, the Bangkok Post noted, “Hours after she left Yala, the militants launched another bombing wave.” Such slight surges after a major visit has been consistent over time.

The Bangkok Post in an editorial on March 21:

The 2 trillion baht in debt, he said, will be repaid in a period not exceeding 50 years. That means that every Thai citizen today and those who are yet to be born will have to foot the bill for the next half century.

Most critics, including this newspaper, have no objection to the infrastructure projects if they are meant for the benefit of the country and its people. What they are opposed to is the abnormal way the government approaches the projects. That is, to seek outside loans in one lump sum rather than getting funding from annual budgets, and the lack of transparency regarding the projects.

Public participation is non-existent and there is a widespread concern that it will be bypassed for the sake of speedy implementation of the projects. Environmental impact assessment studies which are a must for any projects which may affect the livelihoods of the people and the environment are rarely mentioned.

Suthichai Yoon in an op-ed in The Nation:

Korn Chatikavanija, the former finance minister and the Democrat Party’s deputy leader, posted on Facebook after the Bt2.2-trillion infrastructure loan bill passed its first reading in the House on Friday:

“Minister Kittiratt [na Ranong]: You have betrayed the role as finance minister, who is supposed to maintain fiscal discipline, by proposing the loan bill despite the fact that you could have used the normal budget procedure.”

That was probably the strongest statement from the opposition throughout the debate on the issue. Kittiratt has insisted that the normal budgetary process was circumvented because the government wants to borrow rather than run budget deficits to finance the long-term projects.

…

The debate isn’t about whether we need to build new rail, road, water- and air-transport systems so that Thailand can become Asean’s communications hub. …

Not even the opposition Democrat Party is trying to derail the projects. Instead, it has zeroed in on how the schemes will be financed and how the introduction of the bill might even violate the Constitution and undermine economic stability.

BP: First, it is not a lump sum. The Bangkok Post on March 19:

Mr Kittiratt said the two trillion baht in loans would be secured gradually until the end of 2020. The government would maintain fiscal discipline to ensure that debt repayments each year would not exceed 15% of annual national expenditure.

BP: They haven’t actually borrowed the money yet.

The Nation:

Democrat MP Rachada Dhnadirek said the lists included many projects that the government was not ready to implement at the moment. “Many projects still lack a feasibility study and environmental impact assessments,” she said.

She said that to finance the projects, the government could instead run additional budget deficits of Bt300 billion per year. She suspected the government had a hidden agenda, and pinned her hopes on the bill being unconstitutional.

BP: There is no magic money from the budget. It is not as though if the money comes from a budget deficit that it is cheaper to borrow. Budget deficits have to be financed as well. Have heard multiple mentions by both the opposition and some parts of the media, but can someone somehow explain the budget deficit approach suddenly makes this cheaper or fiscally better? Yes, budget deficits are an alternative, but is it really that different?

On transparency, so because the money does not come from the budget, it will not be possible to scrutinise the government? What is happening now with the media commentary and the opposition in parliament? The project hasn’t even started yet. The complaint about transparency seems premature.

On the Democrats and that they are not trying to derail the projects, as The Nation made clear the other day with an article entitled “Train project ‘will only benefit the rich’”, this is not accurate. Key excerpt from that article:

The opposition Democrat Party mounted an attack on the government in relation to the proposed Bt2-trillion infrastructure projects in the second and final day of the House debate, saying the high-speed-rail system would mostly benefit the rich and there was no proper planning to accommodate changes in the areas involved.

Meanwhile, the Council of State has ruled that the proposed mass-infrastructure projects are legal and can proceed, Finance Ministry permanent secretary Areepong Poo-cha-um said.

Kanok Wongtra-ngan, a Democrat party-list MP, said that as per the calculations of the plan submitted by the administration of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, commuters would end up having to pay about Bt1.30-Bt3.50 per kilometre for the high-speed train. In other words, a 700km journey could cost between Bt1,800 and Bt2,000, higher than some low-cost airlines.

BP: Yet, on the other hand, the Deputy Spokesperson of the Democrats is complaining that Puea Thai copied the policy from the Democrats per Thai Rath (สิ่งที่เป็นโยบายพรรคเพื่อไทย ในขณะนี้น่าจะเป็นนโนยายที่ลอกจากพรรคประชาธิปัต). So they copied a policy to benefit the rich? Look, BP understands the opposition want to raise questions and doubts, but there is an awful lot of mixed messaging here.

On the cost, if you look at the entire infrastructure project, it is both aimed at business (for reducing the cost of freight) and individuals. If you want the faster trip, it will cost more. Just like the skytrain and buses co-exist in Bangkok, so will slower rail transport, planes, and high-speed rail coexist.   

Suthichai Yoon in an op-ed in The Nation continues:

The government can now proceed to borrow Bt2 trillion over the next seven years, with repayment to be made over the next 50 years. Interest could top Bt3 trillion, bringing the total debt to Bt5 trillion, prompting opposition leader Abhisit Vejjajiva to suggest that the total repayment burden might be spill over into “the next life”.

The weak link in the whole presentation is that the government has yet to produce an environmental-impact assessment (EIA) for some of the expensive projects in the package. It has produced no concrete plans to make the whole process transparent enough to soothe public fears of massive corruption, which has always been considered part and parcel of spending on major projects, past, present and future.

The Bangkok Post again:

Each project in the government’s 2-trillion-baht infrastructure plan must get cabinet approval and undergo an environmental impact assessment, says the government’s planning agency.

Megaprojects are required to be sent first to the NESDB for consideration before going to the cabinet for approval, according to a report by the National Economic and Social Development Board submitted to the government yesterday

BP: BP finds this whole criticism premature again. We are in the very, very early stages of the project. We have Cabinet and parliamentary go-ahead for the overall project so now each project they will conduct an EIA, go to the NESDB, the Cabinet and probably other committees.

Actually, what BP would look to see is questioning the whole investment scheme in the first place. Is it worth it? What are the pros and cons of the various projects. Then, if they are problems, what are the problems and how can it be made better?

One issue that has been repeatedly raised in recent years is how dangerous roads are in Thailand – see this article as one example –  but BP is surprised how little mention of a faster, safer means of transport of high-speed rail has not been mentioned in connection with this.

Then the issue about the projects themselves. For instance, the three high-speed train routes; Bangkok-Chiang Mai, Bangkok-Padang Besar and Bangkok-Nong Khai which have been touted as the flagship infrastructure projects in the government’s publicity campaign. We were led to believe that these projects would be completed withing the two trillion baht investment. Alas, we were wrong! We were told only half-truths.

Again, the full truth about these projects comes out only when the person responsible is quizzed, put under pressure.

Recently, Transport Minister Chatchart Sitthipan meekly admitted that the Bangkok-Chiang Mai high-speed train project would stop at Phitsanuloke, the Bangkok-Padang Besar project would stop at Hua Hin and the Bangkok-Nong Khai project would end at Korat, Nakhon Ratchasima.

Which means that there will be a second and, probably, third phases of development for the high-speed train services to be fully realised. Minister Chatchart said that the private sector might be interested in the projects after they have seen the initial development, and might invest in the unfinished parts of the megaprojects.

On March 19, 2013, Cabinet approved the 2 trillion Baht infrastructure loan bill

The Bangkok Post on March 20, 2013:

The government will select just one firm from all bidders to run four high-speed train lines, probably by the third quarter of the year, Transport Minister Chadchat Sittipunt said on Wednesday.

…

The first four lines to be put to bids will run from Bangkok to Pattaya, Phitsanulok, Nakhon Ratchasima and Hua Hin.

Once it is running, the eastern train to Pattaya will be extended to Rayong and probably Chanthaburi and Trat. Long range plans call for other extensions as well. The northern train will be further built from Phitsanulok to Chiang Mai; Nong Khai is already planned to be the eventual terminus of the Northeast route from Nakhon Ratchasima, and the line to Hua Hin will go further south to Padang Besar in Songkhla province, at the Malaysia border.

The government expects the country’s first high-speed train between Bangkok and Pattaya to be running by 2018. The lines to Phitsanulok, Nakhon Ratchasima and Hua Hin are scheduled to be completed in 2019.

High-speed train plans are central to the government’s two-trillion baht scheme for megaprojects to improve infrastructure.

The Bangkok Post on March 23, 2013:

According to the Transport Ministry, the first phase of the four high-speed routes will run from Bangkok to Phitsanulok (342 kilometres), Nakhon Ratchasima (256 km), Pattaya (187 km) and Hua Hin (225 km).

…

In phase two of the high-speed rail network, routes will extend to Chiang Mai in the North, Nong Khai in the Northeast, Rayong and probably Chanthaburi and Trat in the East and Padang Besar in Songkhla in the South.

BP: Look there have been different variations of the plan and it has changed over time so from that perspective BP can understand the confusion.  The plan was approved by Cabinet on March 19 and the next day (usually articles appearing on March 20 are written the day before….) the Bangkok Post had an article with details of the plan. A few days later there was another article. How was that unclear? It wasn’t some information suddenly revealed one week later. His own paper had the details for the following day’s paper. Perhaps, Veera should pay closer attention to his own newspaper.

btw, not sure why he only refers to 3 and doesn’t mention the other route passing Pattaya and Rayong. Surely, that line is just as important….

Media Censorship and Self Censorship: What Is the Role of Thailand’s Public Broadcasters?
A panel discussion

8pm, Thursday March 28, 2013

(Please see pricing and reservation procedure below)

First it was a soap opera Nua Mek 2 on Thailand’s channel 3 that was yanked off the air after its 9th episode (there were 12 in all), as was quoted in the press the content of the show had violated the Broadcast and Telecommunications Operations Act. In particular it was Section 37 which bars broadcast content that seeks to overthrow the constitutional monarchy, threatens national security or morality, constitutes profanity or harms people’s mental or physical health. Social media buzzed with speculation to “political interference” while audiences were left with a real life cliff hanger.

Just a few months, later the popular Thai talk show “Tob Jote Prathet Thai” or roughly translated to “Answering Thailand’s Issues” on Thai PBS held a 5 episode week long discussion about the role of the constitutional monarchy in Thailand. Featuring several well known figures, it was heralded as a breakthrough for open discussion about a topic that is seen as the most sensitive issue in the Kingdom. When Thai PBS pulled the 5th installment of the program, which it later aired, more drama ensued with the police now combing the series for any lese majeste content. Small protests took place outside of Thai PBS and underscore just what a flashpoint continues to be.

Join us for a panel who will discuss the role of Thai pubic broadcasters and whether their mission is to serve the public by providing factual information and room for debate, upholding the prevailing ideology of the country and its laws, or a combination of the two.

On the panel are:

Supinya Klangnarong, a Thai media rights advocate who is also on Thailand’s National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission (NBTC). The Commission oversees all public and private media outlets.

Vornai Vanijaka, a print and TV social and political commentator

Saksith Saiyasombut, Thai political blogger and freelance foreign correspondent

BP: See the FCCT website for more details.

Somkiat Tangkitvanich of TDRI has an op-ed in the Bangkok Post on education reform. Key excerpts:

One of TDRI’s research priorities is education reform. Our research team has found there are two fundamental problems in our education system:1) It lacks an accountability system, and

2) It does not equip students with the skills necessary for modern living.

…

Teachers are still paid higher salaries and can be promoted to higher positions if they can please school heads and those who evaluate them. School heads still keep their jobs even when most students fail tests.

So, we propose an accountability system be established. Teachers and principals should be made more accountable to students and parents, and we can do this by linking their remuneration to students’ learning outcomes. This should be coupled with enhancing 21st century skills for our youngsters.

…

The new curriculum should be lean and interdisciplinary, and incorporate an element of thinking

…

The Ministry of Education should stop monopolising teacher training and decentralise the role to schools, which should be allowed to choose training programmes which are most appropriate to them.

Different schools have different needs, and the government should provide autonomy at the school level, but maintain its role in providing the budget and assessing the school’s knowledge management programme.The

BP: He talks in more depth about some of the points above and others in the article so have a read of the full article.

Some comments:

1. Will it not be easier to promote thinking at schools when access to information is not limited and there are not so many restrictions on free speech? This is a societal problem and not limited to the education system. Unless people have access to information and ideas and given the space to express their thoughts, it will be hard to incorporate an element of thinking into the education system.

NOTE: Having said that, in BP’s conversations with recent university graduates they are certainly much more open to full and frank discussions about certain entities.

2. Pay for performance is a controversial issue. OECD data suggests in certain circumstances there is evidence it works (PDF):

A look at the overall picture reveals no relationship between average student performance in a country and the use of performance-based pay schemes. In other words, some high-performing education systems use performance-based pay while others don’t. But the picture changes when taking into account how well teachers are paid overall in comparison with national income. in countries with comparatively low teachers’ salaries (less than 15% above GDP per capita), student performance tends to be better when performance-based pay systems are in place, while in countries where  teachers are relatively well-paid (more than 15% above GDP per capita), the opposite is true. So for countries that do not have the resources to pay all of their teachers well, it is worth having a look at the experience of those countries that have  introduced performance-based pay schemes.

BP: See also trials in India and Brazil, but in most countries teachers have either seriously questioned or reject many, if not all, elements of the scheme.

However, teacher and bureaucrats are fairly entrenched in their positions. Just look at the what is happening in the public health sector.

The Nation:

The Public Health Ministry yesterday vowed to go ahead with its ambitious plan to restructure the country’s public-health system, which will take effect by October 1. The plan calls for reform of the structure of health-related agencies and decentralisation of the ministry’s authority to local bodies.

The massive overhaul is aimed at improving the public health system and making it more efficient, the ministry’s permanent secretary Dr Narong Sahametha said.

The Nation:

Public Health Minister Pradit Sinthawanarong has been on a hot seat since his ministry introduced the Pay-for-Performance (P4P) concept for its medical staff.

The scheme is getting full support from medical workers who work in cities and towns, as they stand to enjoy better pay for the workload they shoulder. But those working in rural areas are against it, saying many of their colleagues will be lured to work in urban hospitals.

The Rural Doctor Society, a powerful group of up-country medical workers, staged a protest against the new pay scheme on Tuesday and threatened to rally every Tuesday until the public health minister steps down.

…

Observers see this move [about restructuring the agencies] as an attempt to weaken or even dissolve the independent agencies under the Public Health Ministry

…

The public health minister’s latest move has put him on a collision course with the Rural Doctor Society, which has enjoyed a strong bargaining power in the Public Health Ministry. Nonetheless, Pradit has vowed to complete his reform mission within seven months, even if he “gets hurt” in the process.

His collision with the Rural Doctors Society is just the first round. If he goes ahead with his reform plans, he will certainly clash head-on with the more powerful independent agencies in the ministry and end up putting his ministerial seat at stake.

The Bangkok Post:

The cabinet has approved in principle a 3-billion baht performance-based payment scheme despite rural doctors staging a protest rally yesterday.

…

However, he [the Minister] said many areas are no longer isolated and rural doctors should receive an allowance based on workload and performance.

…

The hardship allowance is currently based on the degree of isolation of the area in which the doctors work and the conditions under which they work.

…

But from next month, most doctors who receive hardship allowances will have their rates cut in half.

The ministry has opted to pay the allowance based on doctors’ performance.

The allowance for those working in high-risk areas such as the far South, however, will remain unchanged.

Dr Kriangsak said the new system will force many doctors into private hospitals where they can earn more for doing the same amount of work.

The Nation (article has an excellent graph):

At present, the size of the rural doctors’ monthly allowance is based on the remoteness of their location and their number of years in the job. But from April 1 the remoteness allowance that now covers 736 rural hospitals will shrink to cover just 122 hospitals. Meanwhile, under the new system, the allowance will expand to cover dentists, nurses and pharmacists, as well as doctors. Doctors not on duty would also be deprived of the “currently-automatic” allowance.

The Nation on the position of the Rural Doctors Society:

But in 2008, the government offered a higher special allowance by adding up the number of years that medical workers have worked in rural areas.

….

“Pradit will drag the public health system that provided for people living in rural areas backward if he still goes ahead with his plan,” Dr Suphat Ha-Suwankit said. He is the director of a state hospital in Songkhla’s Chana district.

Dr Suphat said the current allowance based on remote area status encouraged many medical workers to work at rural hospitals.

“In 2008, there were just 1,000-something doctors in rural areas. Today, their number has jumped to over 4,000. Of them, 200 are medical specialists,” Kriengsak pointed out.

So, he insisted that the country needed to continue with the initiative launched in 2008

Although, like with any change, not everyone is opposed. The Bangkok Post:

Wichit Srisuphan, Thailand Nursing and Midwifery Council president, said nurses will support the ministry’s payment change.

Jongkon Intasarn, Community Nurse Associate president, said the hardship allowance changes did not affect nurses.

…

Ms Jongkon said nurses have been paid based on their performance for several years.

The payments have helped increase nursing staff efficiency, she said.

It was fair that those who worked harder should be paid more, she said.

The Nation on another doctor’s group that is not opposed:

Dr Prachum-porn Booncharoen, president of the Thai Federation of General and Central Hospital Doctors, said pay for performance would not really remove the incentives for doctors working in remote areas.

“They will still be entitled to a special allow-ance. In some very remote areas, the amount will not drop. In other areas, the amount will be adjusted to ensure all medical workers get the extra wage,” she said.

Prachumporn said the special allowance would disappear only if the rural medical workers had been in the services for more than 21 years. By that time, she said, they already held executive positions and received another type of allowance associated with those posts.

“The pay-for-performance system will mean fairer remuneration for young doctors,” she said. 

Prachumporn said at rural hospitals, those who had to work really hard were mostly young doctors. She said older doctors should not try to block pay for performance because they would lose some benefits.

Then, Voranai in an op-ed in the Bangkok Post:

Healthcare is a basic necessity that a government must provide for the people. But just this Tuesday, almost 1,000 rural doctors and dentists from across the country gathered at Government House to protest against a new public health policy to cut their hardship allowance and base payments on performance.

Rural doctors and dentists, those who make sacrifices and endure hardships, already underpaid and underappreciated, are angry and are protesting. 

According to the Public Health Ministry’s 2010 figures, in Bangkok the patient/doctor ratio was 1,052 patients per doctor, but nationwide it’s 2,893 patients per doctor – in Chaiyaphum province, 9,794 patients per doctor. The worst ratios are in the Isan region, the Pheu Thai Party’s stronghold.

If the number stands today (and yes, statistics is a tricky game, so don’t take it too literally) then 1,000 doctors protesting means 2,893,000 patients are without their doctors. The entire situation smells of a failure by the Thai government to provide sufficient healthcare for its citizens.

BP: Now, can you imagine if teachers started to protest, we may get a “nuanced argument” with a simple calculation on how many kids won’t have a teacher and criticism of the government failing to prove sufficient education. Pressure will come on the Public Health Minister to compromise more and restore some of the benefits that will be cut  and perhaps the Minister will lose his job. Reforming is difficult as entrenched interests are everywhere. Taking on both public health and education at the same time is very unlikely and the government may be stung by the likely increasing problems from the public health reforms to shy away from reforms to the education sector….

NOTE: To clarify, this post is not a criticism of what TDRI’s Somchai is proposing. In fact, find little to disagree with what he is saying although it is always the implementation of such reforms which are the difficult issue. This post is to highlight the problems of reform and how difficult it will be to reform.

The country’s most famous fugitive, Thaksin Shinawatra, circles the globe in his private jet, chatting with ministers over his dozen cellphones, texting over various social media platforms and reading government documents e-mailed to him from civil servants, party officials say.

It might be described as rule by Skype. Or governance by instant messenger, a way for Mr. Thaksin to help run the country without having to face the warrant for his arrest in a case that many believe is politically motivated.

…

“We can contact him at all hours,” said Charupong Ruangsuwan, the interior minister and secretary general of Mr. Thaksin’s Pheu Thai Party. “The world has changed. It’s a boundless world. It’s not like a hundred years ago when you had to use a telegraph.”

To illustrate the point during an interview, Mr. Charupong took out his iPhone and scrolled through a list of phone numbers for Mr. Thaksin. (Mr. Thaksin gives different numbers to different people, often depending on seniority, party officials say.)

“If we’ve got any problem, we give him a call,” Mr. Charupong said.

Mr. Thaksin himself declined to talk by phone, or Skype, for this article.

…

Ms. Yingluck, 45, has on occasion sought to play down her brother’s role. Soon after taking office, when Mr. Thaksin joined a weekly cabinet meeting via Skype, reporters asked who was really the head of the government.

…

Many of the Skype sessions are reported in the Thai news media. This month, Mr. Thaksin had a video chat to discuss coming elections for governor in Bangkok. The one-hour video chat made news because party officials reported that Mr. Thaksin had told his colleagues that it did not matter whom they nominated because even a utility pole would defeat the opposition.

…

Mr. Charupong, the interior minister, says Mr. Thaksin’s distance gives him useful perspective and likened him to the coach of a soccer team (in this case, the cabinet).

Elaborating on the upsides of having the brother-sister team in charge, he said: “It’s like we have a prime minister in the country and another prime minister overseas. And we work together. This is our strength.”

The Bangkok Post in September 2011:

Former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra confirmed the belief that he is the real boss in charge of the new government when he lectured cabinet ministers on how to run the country via Skype.

Cabinet members from the Pheu Thai Party on Wednesday were called to a meeting at the Pheu Thai Party’s head office for a Skype date with Thaksin, who remains a fugitive overseas.

A Pheu Thai source said Thaksin had found that messages he had tried to convey to the ministers through Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, his younger sister, were not getting across.

Therefore, he had to call “a cabinet meeting” via Skype to make sure he could communicate more directly and more effectively with the ministers.

BP: This information is provided by a source, but the Deputy Prime Minister confirmed Thaksin spoke to Puea Thai Cabinet Ministers. The Nation:

“I have two advisers: Thaksin and former prime minister Somchai Wongsawat. I asked [Thaksin] for advice; he did not Skype the meeting unsolicited,” said Yongyuth, who is also Pheu Thai Party leader.

Since the Bangkok gubernatorial race loss by Puea Thai, Thaksin has remerged. The Nation:

Former premier Thaksin Shinawatra’s address to Pheu Thai Party via Skype on Monday once again proved that he is the leader, something Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra has been consistently denying, at least in public.

Thaksin spoke on a number of topics, from personal to political issues, in a manner that shows he is in full command. His orders to the Pheu Thai Party were testimony to the fact that it is he who calls the shots.

During his address, he instructed the party to push for charter amendment, especially provisions related to party dissolution, and also on the amnesty bills.

BP: Also, see the Bangkok Post. Again, it was sources, but again we have confirmation. The Bangkok Post:

Former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra did not order Pheu Thai to push for an amnesty law when he talked via Skype with the party’s coordinating committee yesterday, his legal adviser and close aide Noppadon Pattama said on Tuesday.

Mr Noppadon admitted Thaksin had phoned in on Skype, but said reports that he ordered Pheu Thai to push for quick action in passing an amnesty law for political offenders were not correct.

BP: Noppadon is probably right on the “quick”. Most articles quoting sources about what Thaksin said didn’t mention  ”quick” although it seemed to have been interpreted by some as such. It is going to take many, many months for any amnesty bills to pass anyway. Thaksin’s Skype phone-in was more confirmation that he wants amnesty to go ahead.

Last week, Thaksin had another skype phone-in, this time with Puea Thai members (and also again yesterday) as well as meeting with some reds (and possible others) in Hong Kong. It can be debated the precise words that Thaksin told people, but there is no doubt he is phoning in and “giving advice”. Thaksin has come out of the shadows again and his influence on the government is demonstrated through these phone-ins. To deny this is silly. Perhaps, he should consider whether his phone-ins are for his benefit or for that of the PM?

First, “Burmese women molested by men claiming to be Thai police“. After a long horrific story, the article states:

The four migrant workers from Myanmar had just finished their factory shift. Unlike the estimated two million Burmese workers who are here illegally, they have official paperwork, but that didn’t help them.

Burmese migrants are used to random searches by Thai police who prey on migrants for easy bribes. However for Nyo and her friends, a shakedown became an assault – an abusive routine that rights workers describe as “systematic and prevalent.”

…

Andy Hall, a migration expert at Mahidol University in Bangkok, told TrustLaw that extortion and abuse of migrant workers by law enforcement officials and people claiming to be law enforcement officials is systematic and prevalent, particularly in areas with high concentrations of non-Thai nationals.

“It’s almost impossible for a powerless migrant worker to gain access to justice unless their case is heavily publicised and they are backed up by influential persons or law enforcement officials themselves,” he said.

Second, “From beauty queen to abused wife to lawyer and activist – a survivor’s story“, on the case of well-known Thai beauty queen. Key excerpts:

Over almost a year the abuse got progressively worse. He hit her, poured hot candle wax on her body and once forced her at gunpoint to walk naked down the street, she said.

Neighbours knew but were scared to intervene. Her husband, the son of a retired army general, had guns.

…

One day, her husband fired his gun at the wall and the bullet flew past her. She decided to leave. She climbed the wall around their home, ran away and hid in a friend’s house.

Her husband threatened to kill her but he spoke to the press first, saying she had run away because of jealousy. This forced her to tell her side of the story.

“Then he said maybe I have HIV. So I had to go to the hospital, take a test and prove that I don’t have HIV,” she said.

The media circus went on for weeks but there was a silver lining. A women’s organisation contacted Areewan and sent a lawyer to advise her.

“That was the first time I learned I actually have rights over my own body and no one can hurt it, not even my husband,” she said.

BP: No doubt the press just printed his allegations without a thought of verifying what he said first… Nevertheless, it must be said once the story did come out, there was widespread condemnation of her husband, and if BP’s memory is correct, a very long story in the Bangkok Post about the case.

Third, “For Thai rape victims, seeking justice is another assault“:

Noi’s abuser is free on bail, and his family is threatening to kill hers. She lives like a fugitive in a shelter for abused women on the outskirts of Bangkok. When she visits her family, she must sneak in the back door and stay inside for safety.

…Other studies show an acceptance of violence. In 2010, more than 60 percent of Thais thought it justifiable for a man to beat his wife, higher than Indonesia (less than 20 percent) and India (about 40 percent), a U.N. report showed.

…“Our culture has this view that a woman’s body has a price attached,” said Naiyana Supapueng, a former commissioner of the National Human Rights Commission who heads the Teeranat Kanjanauaksorn Foundation, working on human rights and gender equality.

“When you marry someone, there is dowry involved. We see (women’s bodies) as a commodity.”

…

Evidence of the victim’s background, sexual history or sexual relationship with the perpetrator – inadmissible in many countries – are often used in Thai courts to undermine a victim’s credibility, she added.

Some blame the overwhelmingly male government for the discrimination.

While Thailand has a female prime minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, in 2010, women represented only 13 percent of the lower house of parliament, and 6 percent of judges, said the U.N.

BP:  These are serious issues that get little attention compared to many other countries….

BP did some analysis in this previous post, but upon reflection it was somewhat inadequate as didn’t have complete details of all previous elections so wanted to make some additional points.

A. The result

NOTE: Valid is not the correct word, but mean votes for candidates excluding no votes/spoilt votes.

Source: BMA Web site

B. Comparison with previous races:

Source: BMA, Wikipedia, and Daily News.

NOTES: Dem = Democrat Party candidate; (also includes Bhichit Rattankul in 1996 although he ran as an independent)* TS = candidate of the pro-Thaksin party whether it is Thai Rak Thai, PPP, or Puea Thai (This also includes Pavena who was an independent in 2004, but was unofficially backed by Thai Rak Thai.); Major Party = pre-2000 party which either finished first or second (i.e major competitor of the Democrats) and includes Palang Dhamma, Prachakorn Thai.  Third parties = votes for candidates that were not the Democrats, pro-TS party, or a “major party” at the time, e.g. Paveena or Samak in 2000. Independent = votes for candidates who were not affiliated with any party

BP: Decided to separate out third party from independent votes. The Democrats have always had a major party as a competitor. Since 2000 that has been a pro-Thaksin party

Then looking at the votes as %:

Notes: Having subtracted no votes/spoilt votes for inclusion in % calculation.

Below is the combined 3rd party and independent vote:

BP:

1. The Democrats have been fairly consistent with getting between 38.2% to 47.75% except for 1985, 1990 and 2000. In 1985 and 1990, both elections were won by Chamlong Srimuang – now of the PAD – as part of the Palang Dhamma Party. In 2000, because of the weak candidate of the Democrats and to deny the pro-TS Sudarat a victory, many Democrat voters voted for Samak.

2. While the Democrats have mostly done well, there has always been another competitor whether that was Chamlong Srimuang’s Palang Dhamma party or Samak’s Prachakorn Thai party. After the Democrats won in 1975, they lost in 1985, 1990, and 1992 although in 1985 and 1992, they came second. However, with 4 victories in a row now, they are the dominant party in Bangkok gubernatorial races, but the role of the competitor of the Democrats has now become Puea Thai.

3. To restate what have said before, the decline of the third party/independent vote is just a further sign of the move to a more two party system.

C: District-by-District comparison

There are 50 districts in Bangkok. Below are some screenshots from the Web site of ThaiPBS, the public service broadcaster, looking at the districts won by each candidate in the 2004, 2008, 2009, and 2013 elections. Blue = Democrat; Red = Thai Rak Thai/PPP/Puea Thai.

2004:

Source: ThaiPBS

2008:

Source: ThaiPBS

2009:

Source: ThaiPBS

2013:

Source: ThaiPBS

BP: So 39 districts to the Democrats; 11 districts to Puea Thai. Puea Thai are strong in certain areas and they have improved on previous elections, but still a big gap.

D. Turn-out

BP: Turn-out was unsurprisingly high at 63.98% which is the highest ever just pipping the 62.5% in 2004, but then again there has been a trend over time – as indicated by the black trend line in the above chart – for a higher turnout over time. Actually, the turn-out was fairly uniform with 61.29%-66.88% turnout in 44 of the 50 Districts. It is healthy in a democracy for there to be a higher turnout so this is encouraging.  

*Do realize that including Bhichit Rattanakul as a Democrat is debatable, but he had ran as their candidate in 1992 and the Democrats didn’t run anyone against him in 1996.

btw, will also look at polling organisations, but will do it per polling organisation.