It was announced that the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) will hold formal exploratory talks next month to restart the peace negotiations.

Unlike the other peace process, between the Philippine government and the National Democratic Front (NDF), peace negotiations between the Aquino administration and the MILF have been mired with semantics and technicalities ranging from questions on the third party facilitator to discussions on the terms of references and, lately, assurances demanded by the Moro rebel group that GRP and GPH are one and the same.

GRP refers to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines which entered into a formal ceasefire with the MILF that is still in effect despite a lull in the peace negotiations.  The MILF wants to be sure that all previous agreements with the government are binding whence the panels resume talks with the government most likely will already be using Government of the Philippines (GPH) as its new nomenclature.

Beyond that however, the MILF will have to prove that it exercises full control and supervision of its ground units.

Unlike the NDF which has exhibited vertical as well as horizontal organizational discipline, the MILF has yet to prove that it can effectively reign over some of its field commanders.

The 2008 MILF attacks immediately after the Supreme Court declared the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) unconstitutional placed the MILF in an awkward position, defending ground commanders Umbra Kato and Bravo from their senseless attacks on civilian communities.

While the MILF central committee conducted an investigation because of the immense international pressure and public clamor that ensued, it never made public the results despite assurances from senior MILF leader Ghadzali Jaafar that the rebel group will provide the media a popular version of its findings.

While undoubtedly the country’s largest rebel group, the MILF is also fractured and dangerously very loose.  The fluidity of its power base is heavily reliant on loyalties to their field commanders.

While it is to the advantage of both the MILF and the government that the Moro rebel group only speaks through its official spokespersons and members of the negotiating panel, the lack of media exposure of its field commanders and mid-level leadership is disconcerting.  What goes beyond the core leadership of the MILF is one for the guessing game.

The MILF will also have to assure its counterpart in the negotiating table that whatever agreement forged, it can reign over its membership who has grown wary of failed agreements in the past.

For the MILF leadership, it is essential and primordial to prove that both politically and organizationally it can exert and exercise full control over its commanders and members.