Joshua Kurlantzick, a fellow for South-East Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations, has an article in the London Review of Books entitled “Red vs Yellow”. Would link to it, but well the last two paragraphs talk about a sensitive subject. Kurlantzick’s article is very critical of both the establishment and Thaksin. He does make some odd assertions at time, for example:

Like the yellow shirts, the red shirts were prepared to use violence. Last April, gunmen pulled alongside the car of Sondhi Limthongkul, the head of the PAD, and fired at it. He survived, though doctors had to remove bullet fragments from his skull.

Not sure this is the best example of red on yellow violence. BP would counter with Thitinan in FEER in April 2009:

Suffice it to say that the assassination attempt has raised political temperatures. Tellingly, Mr. Sondhi’s only son, Jintanart, indicated that it was a “third hand” bent on creating and exploiting a clash between reds and yellows to use as pretext for intervention and a power grab.  Whoever is responsible, the shooting has raised temperatures and is an indication that the crisis and turmoil will persist and could intensify. But this is also the first time that yellows are not blaming reds but in fact (based on Mr. Sondhi’s son’s account) the yellows are putting the reds in the same boat as mutual victims of this murder attempt.

BP: Yes, the initial suspicion fell on Thaksin/the reds, but well suspicion soon started to switch to others and everything became very quiet….

The conclusion on what the future holds is very pessimistic:

It is difficult to see a way back to stability. Right now, even a free election would be unlikely to calm things down. As Montesano notes, it would probably return Thaksin or his proxies to power, which would provoke his enemies all over again. The rural poor will never go back to the days when they simply accepted the rule of Bangkok. Yet the elites remain unwilling to give up any of their power. The anti-Thaksin forces are doing nothing to help calm the situation. In recent years, Thailand’s courts have been on the offensive against the former prime minister. Some observers speak of a judiocracy: courts hand down decisions hamstringing opponents of the Democrats, the military and the crown (the king has given several speeches essentially calling on the judiciary to play precisely this role). People on the wrong side of court decisions are given little room to appeal. In February the courts seized the majority of Thaksin’s assets; his allies vowed to fight on, calling for a million-person march in Bangkok. With Thaksin gone, his supporters have formed their own self-sustaining networks, which will probably survive even if he is no longer able to fund them. From exile, Thaksin promises: ‘I haven’t received justice and I will not give up.’

BP: Well, that judiocracy reference sounds familiar, but Kurlantzick is right to be pessimistic.

btw, this was funny though:

After the coup, and the subsequent questionable judicial decisions which disqualified pro-Thaksin candidates from standing as prime minister, the elites were able to install Abhisit Vejjajiva, a suave young British-educated technocrat who was about as comfortable dealing with the working class as Prince Philip.

BP: Never thought of that analogy before…