DEPENDING on which side you want to believe, the armed strength of the New People’s Army (NPA) in Mindanao could be as low as 1,500 regulars but could go as high as 4,000 to 6,000 fully armed combatants.

But one thing is being acknowledged even by the military: almost one half of the total armed strength of the NPAs in the country is deployed in Mindanao.

This numbers game has become a relevant topic in the light of the bold target of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the political arm of the NPA, to achieve a strategic stalemate between its forces and the Philippine military within five years.

It is likewise significant to discern where now stands the communist rebel movement in Mindanao after 41 years of Maoist-inspired protracted guerilla warfare.

Three-phased People’s War

Pioneers of the communist rebel movement in Mindanao, of which only a handful is left, have seen their armed strength grew from zero to where it is now.  From a virgin countryside when martial law was declared in 1972 to a hotbed of “the revolution” that it is today.

Ka Oris, a.k.a Jorge Madlos, one of those handful original CPP cadres from Mindanao still carrying the torch with utmost revolutionary fervor, said two years ago that the rebel movement has regained its organizational strength and military capability to the level with that of the 1980s and that it was poised to enter the advance sub-stage of the strategic defensive phase of it people’s war.

The CPP-NPA and its political umbrella, the National Democratic Front (NDF), have broken down their revolutionary war into three strategic phases: the strategic defensive, the strategic stalemate and strategic counter offensive.

Of the three phases, NPA combatants were being conditioned by CPP cadres that the first stage of its war is the hardest and most difficult as they build up their armed strength and mass base. 

This phase is further broken down into three sub-stages: the early sub-stage, the advance sub-stage and the counter offensive.  On the main however, the NPAS are on the defensive mode, hitting only at numerically inferior and isolated forces of the Philippine military and police while avoiding long and decisive battles.

The NPA combatants have been given no timetable when they will leap to the next level – until the most recent statement issued by the CPP central leadership.

With its latest announcement, it is safe to conclude that the CPP-NPA-NDF has apparently viewed the failure of the Arroyo government to dismantle any of its main revolutionary structure, in time for the government’s 2010 target of totally eradicating the communist movement in the country, as a measure of its own strength.

By announcing a five-year target to achieve parity in military capability with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the communist rebel movement is also effectively declaring that it has gained enough overall strength to force the hands of the Philippine military into more decisive and bigger battles.

Achieving military parity with the AFP will rely on how fast the CPP-NPA-NDF will be able to build up its forces and expand its mass base, however.

Military strength

The exact number of NPA regulars has always been a figure known only to top and key leaders of the communist rebel movement.

But by counting the number of regions, fronts and districts of the communist rebel movement, one will have an idea how much is the total armed strength of the NPAs.

The CPP-NPA-NDF in Mindanao has five regional party committees covering 39 guerilla fronts and an undetermined number of districts and sections.

Each regional party committee has a center of gravity, also known as its main regional guerilla unit (MRGU), with at least a company-size formation of NPA combat unit.

Each regional party committee of the communist rebel movement has between five to eight guerilla fronts, which in turn each has a minimum of a platoon of NPA regulars.  A guerilla front (equivalent to a province under the geographical political unit of the Philippine government) may consist of between three to eight districts (equivalent to towns or municipalities). A district is believed to maintain an oversized squad of NPAs.  Each district is further composed of sections which is the equivalent of barangays (villages).  In addition to the party section committee, the CPP-NPA-NDF is said to have organized ‘people’s militia units’ which are also armed with vintage rifles and handguns.

The Mindanao Commission of the CPP-NPA-NDF itself is also known to have its own mobile armed unit believed to number at least a hundred NPAs.

Larger formation, more offensives

Ka Oris told reporters invited during the anniversary celebration of the CPP that the rebel movement will aim to build battalion-size formations in every regions within the next five years.

“The days of attacking town centers will likely to occur again,” he said.

In the 1980’s, the NPAs were bold and strong enough to occupy isolated town centers for hours and set up checkpoints along the national highways.

But Ka Oris quickly added that this could only happen if – despite the law of uneven development – the revolutionary movement is able to expand and consolidate its mass base by establishing ‘organs of political power’ in large areas of the countryside.

“To build up our forces, we have to rely on our own strength,” the rebel spokesman said.

Ka Oris said more than 90 per cent of their armaments were seized from the military and police during tactical offensives.

In 2009 alone, the NPA said it was able to seize more than 300 high powered firearms – enough to arm more than a battalion of armed regulars.

The NPAs also warned that they will bring their war in cities and urban centers.

“We are in the process of deploying armed city partisans to strike at ‘enemy facilities’ and ‘to punish’ government officials with blood debts to the people,” added Ka Oris.

The rebel movement in Mindanao said it has increased its armed strength and overall capability by five per cent over the last two years.

The continuing global crisis also drove many of its supporters to enlist in the NPA.

“We are running low on firearms vis-à-vis the number of potential recruits who are volunteering in large numbers,” Ka Oris revealed.

He appealed to supporters and allies to give firearms “to help advance the revolution.”

Caution and assurance

Despite the twin objectives of escalating the war, Ka Oris was cautious against likening their target to the errors of the 80s when the Party deviated from the people’s protracted war and toyed with ‘insurrectionism’.

He said key party leaders then gave more weight in building the NPA at the expense of expanding and consolidating its mass base.  As a result, despite initial successes in large scale military offensives, the NPAs suffered huge setbacks and also alienated their mass base due to ill-timed military offensives.

Ka Oris likewise assured that excesses of the armed city partisans in the ’80s would no longer recur.

Ka Oris said, in theory, if they could match even 30 to 40 per cent of the military strength of the Philippine government, they would have achieved their goal of bringing their war into a military impasse.

“But we do not have to get into that number.  We will build militia forces in every villages and towns,” he said.

There is no hot air in Ka Oris’ statement.

At the outskirts of Marihatag town in Surigao del Sur, at least a battalion of NPA regulars stood guard and performed military drills before reporters and supporters of the rebel movement.

Sympathizers were packing lunches by the hundreds and tens of roasted pig sent by allies and supporters kept coming even after lunch were already being served.

Midway through the program to commemorate the founding anniversary of the CPP, a rebel leader announced that the military and police were conducting checkpoints at the national highway, barely five kilometers away from the site of the anniversary rite where a 40’ by 40’ stage made from freshly brought in 1/2” inch thick plywood was erected.

True enough, on their way down, journalists were held by the military at the junction of the highway.

The military knew that the CPP-NPA-NDF have invited several guests but were wise enough not to launch an attack.

A ceasefire was still in effect but it would not have mattered. 

Had the military ventured a couple of kilometer inside, they would have been ambushed by heavily armed sentries of the NPAs.