Washington is again considering bilateral talks with North Korea.  So far, the Obama administration appears to be sticking with having negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear program mainly done in the six-party format including the US, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China and Russia. 

However, US President Barack Obama had stated during the presidential campaign last year that he wanted the USA to engagewith North Korea bilateraly and specifically criticised the six-party format.  The Obama administration has backed off that view so far but there is a danger that Obama’s basic instinct for “sustained, direct, and aggressive diplomacy” may kick in.

Now is not the time for Washington to embrace one-on-one talks with North Korea. Instead, any one-on-one contacts with the North Koreans should be in close consultation with Washington’s regional allies and used exclusively to prod Pyongyang back to the six-party talks.

South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and new Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyam have formed a united front on North Korea, calling on Pyongyang to quickly come to back to the multilateral talks and pledging to strictly enforce sanctions brought about after nuclear tests in 2006 and earlier this year.  The Seoul-Tokyo link is at least partially aimed at limiting Washington’s freedom to cut a bilateral deal with North Korea.  Both governments fear that the Obama administration will be tempted to repeat the Bush administration’s end-run of its regional allies under the direction of Bush point man Assistant Secretary of Sate Christopher Hill. Washington’s sticking to the six-party format would help prevent a repeat of that debacle.

China has also publicly supported the six-party process and was compelled to support sanctions last spring, but is already skirting them.

In fact, Beijing would like nothing more than to once again see North Korea’s nuclear program be primarily Washington’s concern.  The single best thing the Bush administration did regarding North Korea was to get China on board as a partner in the six-party process.  Doing so had its drawbacks but it made every North Korean provocation a blow to Beijing’s prestige as a regional leader and helped move the UN Security Council member into at least publicly supporting sanctions over North Korea’s nuclear tests. While few had expected China to comply with the sanctions, having them on board prevented a Security Council veto or a even more watered-down sanctions resolution than the UNSC eventually passed.

Considering how the six-party process has tied China’s prestige to a commitment to denuclearize its ally on the Korean peninsula, it is a wonder that China agreed to it in the first place.  Perhaps the prestige of hosting such high-level talks and was more than the Chinese ego could resist. 

Or perhaps Beijing believed that the administration of former South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun, which favored reconciliation with Pyongyang, would tip the balance of the six-party talks in North Korea’s favor. It did to a degree but Roh has been replaced in Seoul by president who takes a much harder line towards Pyongyang.

China would like nothing more at this time than for North Korea to be just a problem for Washington and its allies. The Obama administration would be better off making sure the North Korean tar baby stays stuck to Beijing.